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THE REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF
COMPLIANCE
Asaf Eckstein  and Gideon Parchomovsky 

ABSTRACT
The agency problem, the idea that corporate directors and officers are
motivated to prioritize their self-interest over the interest of their
corporation, has had long-lasting impact on corporate law theory and
practice. In recent years, however, as federal agencies have stepped up
enforcement efforts against corporations, a new problem that is the mirror
image of the agency problem has surfaced—the reverse agency problem. The
surge in criminal investigations against corporations, combined with the
rising popularity of settlement mechanisms including Pretrial Diversion
Agreements (PDAs), and corporate plea agreements, has led corporations to
sacrifice directors and officers in order to reach settlements with law
enforcement authorities as expeditiously as possible.
While such settlements are in the best interest of companies and
shareholders, they have devastating effects for individual directors and
officers. When settling through agreements, suspect companies usually
attribute wrongdoing to a large group of directors and managers, without
distinguishing among guilty and innocent individuals, and surrender all their
information. As a result, directors and officers implicated in settlements may
suffer severe reputational loss and face legal battles brought by corporations.
Furthermore, the wrongdoing attributed to directors and officers in
settlements expose them to derivative lawsuits for breach of their fiduciary
duties. Unfortunately, extant law does not provide directors and officers with
a means to prove their innocence or clear their name. In fact, it does not even
give them a voice in the negotiations leading to the drafting of settlements.
Thus, it dooms many directors and officers who have done no wrong to live
with the mark of Cain and endure the economic consequences thereof.
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To remedy the plight of individual directors and officers, we suggest three
possible legal reforms. The first seeks to amplify the voice of individual
corporate officers in settlement negotiations by giving them a right to a
hearing prior to the finalization of a settlement. The second is to give
directors and officers implicated in settlements the right to bring an action
for a declaratory judgment that could clear their name and preempt
derivative actions against them. The third solution is to recognize a
horizontal fiduciary duty between directors and officers, thereby allowing
innocent directors and officers the right to sue their guilty colleagues for
breaching such duty.

Table of Contents
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 3
THE COMPLIANCE AGE ..................................................................................... 8
A. The Rise of Enforcement Actions .................................................................. 9
B. Pretrial Diversion Agreements ................................................................... 14
1. The Growth in the Use of PDAs ............................................................. 15
2. The Pressure to Settle ............................................................................. 18
3. Plea Agreements ..................................................................................... 24
III. THE REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM .................................................................. 26
A. When Directors and Officers Come Second ............................................... 28
B. The Pooling Effect ...................................................................................... 38
C. The Near Irrelevance of Standard Defense Mechanisms to the Reverse
Agency Problem .................................................................................................. 41
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS................................................................................... 43
A. A Right to a Hearing ................................................................................... 44
B. Declaratory Judgement .............................................................................. 45
C. An Action against Other Directors and Officers ........................................ 47
D. A Lawsuit against the Company? ............................................................... 48
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 49

3

REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE

I.

[7-Aug-19

INTRODUCTION

In this Article, we seek to unveil a new phenomenon that increasingly
permeates the corporate world: the reverse agency problem. To introduce this
problem, we first need to introduce its more famous cousin: the agency
problem. In their seminal book, Berle and Means coined the term agency
problem, which refers to the ability of directors and officers to shirk their
duties and to divert value from corporations, i.e., extract private benefits from
corporations with dispersed ownership.1 The article has had an immediate
and long-lasting effect on corporate law theory and practice. Indeed, no other
scholarly contribution had the same impact on the field. The idea that
directors and officers are willing to sacrifice the interest of the corporation to
promote their narrow self-interest is both intuitive and correct. It would not
be an exaggeration to say that since the book was published in 1932, the
agency problem has been the focal point of corporate law theory.2
Oddly, in recent years we are witnessing a mirror image of the agency
problem: corporations are willing to sacrifice their directors and officers (i.e.,
their agents) at the altar of the corporations’ best interests. We term this trend
“the reverse agency problem.”3 It is not an accident that this problem has
gone unnoticed so far: it is a relatively new phenomenon that did not exist in
the past. Yet, it is significant and ubiquitous and it is only likely to grow in
the future. The reverse agency problem is a byproduct of the age of
compliance. Since the mid-2000s, companies have been exposed to
enforcement actions on the part of various federal regulatory agencies, such
as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), and the Internal Revenue Services (IRS), and criminal proceedings

1

ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
2
Other very famous Articles that discuss various variations of the agency problem
include: Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Ronald J.
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activists Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Zohar Goshen
& Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017) [hereinafter Principal Cost].
3
There is family resemblance between the reverse agency problem and the problem of
principal cost that has been pointed out by Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire in a recent
important article. See Principal Costs, supra note 2. Goshen and Squire’s theory focuses on
the costs created by shareholders, which they divide into “competence costs” and “integrity
costs” and argue that the law should minimize the sum of agency and principal costs. As we
will explain the reverse agency problem is independent of the actions or characteristics of
shareholders. In fact, it is unrelated to the ownership structure. At its heart, it is a problem
that arises from the rational and legitimate actions of the management and directors of firms
in the face of enforcement actions.
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initiated by state agencies, such as the New York State Department of
Financial Services (DFS).4
A considerable number of these investigations do not culminate in
criminal charges. Rather, they are settled outside of court in the form of
“Pretrial Diversion Agreements” (PDAs),5 which includes mainly Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non Prosecution Agreements (NPAs).
Many other cases are settled post-indictment through plea agreement.6 We
refer to these agreements collectively as settlement agreements.
As a part of these agreements, the corporations are required to admit to
various counts of wrongdoing by their directors, managers, and other
employees. These agents, many of whom are no longer employed by the
relevant companies at the time the agreement is consummated, typically have
little or no say in the process and will forever have to live with the admissions
that their corporations have made—admissions that implicate them in
wrongdoing. And although these admissions do not formally bind them, they
have a profound impact on their future. These employees suffer severe
reputational losses as a consequence of these agreements, which often
translate to lost careers and lost income.
Worse yet, the admissions made by corporations invariably expose
directors and officers to follow-up civil suits against them.7 The admissions
in settlement agreements speak of various failures by the directors and
officers. They are drafted in strong language and, thus, serve as an invitation
to shareholders to demand that the corporation sues its directors and officers
for a breach of the duty of loyalty or a breach of the duty of care, and if the
corporation refuses to do so, to initiate a derivative action against them.
And even though the admissions made by a company do not typically
bind the agents and they can bring an independent action to have their name
cleared, they are facing an uphill climb. At that point, the company has given
up on them and sacrificed them on the altar of the wellbeing of the
shareholders. Surprisingly, for many years, law enforcement authorities
refrained from persecuting individual directors and officers 8 and sufficed
4

See infra Section II.A.
See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through NonProsecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2017) ("In the entire period prior to issuance of the
Thompson Memo in January 2003, prosecutors negotiated only thirteen PDAs [pretrial
diversion agreements]. . . . By contrast, we find based on our dataset that they entered into at
least 267 PDAs from 2004 through 2014 (excluding agreements involving antitrust, tax, and
environmental violations)."). See also Section II.B.1.
6
See infra Section II.B.3.
7
See infra note 110.
8
In an effort to respond to a significant criticism arguing that the DOJ fails to prosecute
individuals, in September 2015, the Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates issued a new
policy in the form of a memorandum, entitled “Individual Accountability for Corporate
5
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themselves with the fines they collect from firms. Following harsh criticism
of this practice, in recent years, law enforcement authorities started initiating
legal actions against individual employees, but to a very limited extent.9 In
the small number of cases that law enforcement authorities proceeded to
bring charges against individual employees, the employees did not have the
financial wherewithal or the psychological resources to continue the fight on
their own. Quite surprisingly, however, the individual directors and officers
who got sued have experienced success in court.10 Yet, even if the directors
and officers are ultimately acquitted in court, they still have to confront
prolonged legal battles on multiple fronts as derivative actions may be filed
against them while they struggle to clear their names.
At this point, one may wonder: how can this be? There are two pieces to
the puzzle. The first is clear. Companies that face criminal charges have an
incentive to reach a settlement at all cost. To begin with, once a criminal
investigation is opened against them, companies are at a high risk of criminal
indictment and conviction if they choose not to fully cooperate with the
enforcement authority. As history teaches us, indictment, not to mention
conviction, has a dramatic negative impact on companies.11 The accepted
lore in the corporate law world is that “no major financial services firm has
ever survived a criminal indictment.”12
Furthermore, unlike individuals who are subject to a criminal
investigation, corporations who face criminal allegations have to bear the cost
of the investigation. Although the enforcement authorities do not actively
force suspect corporations to examine the allegations at their own expense,
they condition future settlement on full cooperation, and give corporations
credit for carrying out the investigation on their own and submitting their

Wrongdoing,” or the “Yates Memo.” See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. Att’ys et al., Individual Accountability for
Corporate
Wrongdoing
(Sept.
9,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates Memo].
9
Paola C. Henry, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crimes After the Yates Memo:
Deferred Prosecution Agreements & Criminal Justice Reform, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 153,
160–161 (2016) (“After the release of the Yates Memo, the DOJ continued to use DPAs in
several cases where no individual employees were charged. . . . Thus, the government's
continued use of DPAs without any individual accountability undermines the Yates Memo.”)
10
See infra note 141.
11
Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1886
(2005) (“The adverse publicity that accompanies a prosecution can devastate a
corporation…”). See also infra notes 91 - 97.
12
United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Amici point out
that no major financial services firm has ever survived a criminal indictment”).
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findings to the authorities.13 Actually, as DOJ’s Yates Memo stated: “in order
to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the
Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the
misconduct.”14 The cost of conducting an internal investigation runs in the
tens of millions of dollars and can often reach hundreds of millions of dollars
and it comes on top of standard defense costs.15
To make matters worse, the uncertainty that comes with a criminal
investigation imposes an almost insurmountable drag on the corporation and
its ability to raise money. 16 It constitutes a serious diversion of managerial
resources, forcing the corporation to focus on the criminal investigation,
instead of its core business activity.17 From the vantage point of the company,
dragging out the investigation is tantamount to a death by a thousand cuts as
the costs mount with every day that passes.
On top of it, a criminal investigation harms the company’s reputation and
makes it difficult for the corporation to do business with other companies as
long as the investigation is ongoing. Potential and actual business partners
become suspicious once they learn of the investigation and demand constant
clarifications and assurances from the suspect company. This is especially
true for suspicious financial institutions that inherently rely on business ties
with correspondent banks.18 Naturally, if the clarifications and assurances are
13

Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) 9-28.700—The Value of Cooperation,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-businessorganizations#_ftnref1 (“Cooperation is a mitigating factor, by which a corporation—just
like any other subject of criminal investigation—can gain credit in a case that otherwise is
appropriate for indictment and prosecution.”).
14
Yates Memo, supra note 8, at 2.
15
Samuel Rubinfeld, Costly Corporate Investigations Have No Natural End-Point,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2017) (“The numbers, in some cases, are eye-popping. Wall Mart
Stores, which is still under investigation, has spent $865 million since 2013, according to a
review of its quarterly disclosures; the company says it's cooperating with U.S. authorities
amid discussions of a potential resolution. Avon Products spent about $350 million on
investigation-related costs before agreeing to pay U.S. authorities $135 million to settle its
foreign-bribery probe. Siemens reported spending more than $1 billion on legal costs
before its FCPA resolution in 2008.”). See also Peter J. Henning, The Mounting Costs of
Internal Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2012) (“When a corporation is caught in a
government investigation, the legal fees can quickly exceed $100 million”).
16
Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 509
(2015) (“Legal practitioners stated: The reality is that few public or regulated companies can
withstand the uncertainties and consequences that flow from an unresolved federal criminal
indictment . . . .”)
17
Infra note 84.
18
Greenblum, supra note 11, at 1886 (“The adverse publicity that accompanies a
prosecution can devastate a corporation…, particularly one that relies heavily on its
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not satisfactory, valuable business relationships will be lost. Hence,
corporations will be readily willing to admit to wrongdoing by their agents to
put an end to the investigation and hopefully sweeten the bitter pill by
receiving a reduced fine. 19 In many ways, this is the same dynamic that
undergirds plea bargains.
The second piece of the puzzle is less obvious. It concentrates on the
question of how it is possible that companies are guilty of breaking the law—
and let us be clear: they are—while their agents may be innocent. To get a
handle on the answer to this question, it is necessary to comprehend that the
requirements for imposing criminal liability on corporations differ from those
necessary for imposing criminal liability on individuals. It is significantly
more difficult to impose criminal liability on individuals than on a
corporation.20 In the case of corporations, the elements of an offence, both
the actus reus and the mens rea can be satisfied by conducts and mental states
of different executives and employees, aggregated and imputed to the firm.
In contrast, to impose personal liability, all elements must be satisfied by the
same individual. Hence, it is often impossible to derive the guilt of individual
agents from the admissions made by a corporation.21 At the same time, the
relative ease of finding corporations criminally liable constitutes additional
inducement for them to settle with law enforcement agencies even when it
requires admitting to wrongdoing by their agents.
The desire of firms to enter settlements with law enforcement authority is
perfectly rational. Moreover, they are obligated to do so by law. Presiding
directors and officers, who are required to decide whether to enter into a
settlement with the enforcement authority, owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation, not to their predecessors. For the reasons we explained, closing
criminal investigations and receiving credit for cooperating with law
enforcement authorities are in the best interest of the firm. Hence, the law, by
requiring directors and officers to put the firm’s interests above all other
considerations, exacerbates the plight of past employees.
To address the harsh consequences of the reverse agency problem, we
propose three mechanisms that can alleviate the plight of innocent directors
and officers. The first mechanism seeks to amplify the voice of individual
corporate officers in settlement negotiations by giving them a right to a
hearing prior to the finalization of a settlement. This mechanism would
enable individual directors and officers to review settlements and propose
changes before they are signed. The second mechanism we contemplate is to
reputation in the marketplace, because of the effect on relationship with customers, creditors,
and the public at large.”).
19
See infra note 85.
20
See infra note 83.
21
See infra notes 80–83.
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give individual directors and officers who were implicated in settlements the
right to bring an action for a declaratory judgment that could clear them of
liability. Doing so will grant innocent directors and officers the power to
initiate legal actions in order to dispel the suspicions surrounding them and
preempt derivative actions against them. Our third, and the most far-reaching
mechanism, is to allow innocent directors and officers the right to sue their
colleagues who went astray and precipitated a cascade of harms on the
corporation and its employees.
Structurally, the Article unfolds in three parts. In Part II, we will discuss
the rise in enforcement actions against corporations and PDAs, and explain
how they drive a wedge between the interests of the corporation and its
directors and officers, mainly former directors and officers. In Part III, we
will introduce the reverse agency problem and position it within the rich
conceptual framework of principal-agent conflicts that has been developed
by corporate law theorists. In part IV, we will advance our proposed solutions
to the reverse agency problem. A short conclusion will ensue.

II.

THE COMPLIANCE AGE

We commence our discussion of the reverse agency problem by turning
the spotlight on a recent trend that changes the face of the corporate world: a
dramatic increase in the rate and intensity of criminal enforcement actions
against corporations. Clearly, criminal actions against corporations have been
with us for a long time. In the last two decades, however, law enforcement
authorities have stepped up their enforcement efforts against corporations,
taking them to unprecedented levels. An important corollary of this trend is
the emergence of vast settlements, running in hundreds of millions of dollars,
that were struck between corporations and law enforcement agencies.
These settlements have generated large amounts of money that went into
the pubic fisc and was used in part to continue the enforcement campaign.
The enforcement efforts have intensified in the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2008 and the government bailout of the financial sector.22 In this Part
22

Official statements show that there was an increase in enforcement efforts following
the financial crisis. See, e.g., Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Dep’t of
Just., Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014)
(“Our record demonstrates that when the evidence and the law support it, we do not hesitate
to bring charges against anyone. Between 2009 and 2013, the Justice Department charged
more white-collar defendants than during any previous five-year period going back to at least
1994.”). However, some studies cast doubt on the accuracy of such statements. See JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT
DATA
REVEAL
29
PERCENT
DROP
IN
CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS
OF
CORPORATIONS,
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/#figure1 (last visited July 9, 2019) (suggesting that
“the decline in corporate prosecutions” cannot be fully explained by the increase in the use
of PDAs and may “reflect a general decline in federal prosecution efforts”). It is difficult, if
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we will discuss the increase in enforcement actions against corporations and
explain how they transformed the corporate landscape.
A. The Rise of Enforcement Actions
Recent years have witnessed a sea change in enforcement actions against
corporations. The DOJ, SEC and IRS have invested considerable efforts and
resources in criminal investigations against companies. This trend has grown
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, with some commentators
speculating that criminal enforcement against corporations provides a costeffective method to bring money into the public fisc, and thereby defray, at
least to some extent, the cost of the bailout.
The tidal wave of enforcement actions centered on violations of the
Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA), False Claims Act (FCA), Bank
Secrecy Act23 has exposed companies to an unprecedented level of liability
and risk. In the proceeding paragraphs, we will discuss these changes in
detail. We begin with the FCPA.
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 to combat
the spread of corruption in international business transactions. 24 Until 1998, the
FCPA had very little effect on the ground: investigations and prosecutions were
rare.25 Everything changed in 2005 when FCPA enforcement began in earnest. 26
Nearly seventy percent of DOJ and SEC cases involving the FCPA were commenced
between 2005-2013.27 The renewed focus of the enforcement authorities on FCPA
not impossible, to evaluate which side is correct because doing so requires an examination
of the cases declined by federal prosecutors and “[w]e simply do not have good data on such
cases.” Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail—How Prosecutors Compromise with
Corporations 254 (2014).
23
DOJ also increasingly enforces laws and regulations aimed at preventing money
laundering, environmental and antitrust violations.
24
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, Stat. 1494 (“to
make it unlawful for an issuer of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of [the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934] or an issuer required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of such
Act to make certain payments to foreign officials and other foreign persons, to require such
issuers to maintain accurate records, and for other purposes.”)
25
For historical background of FCPA enforcement until the 2000s, see, e.g., Barbara
Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corruption Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is
Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1093 (2012). See also Brandon L. Garrett,
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1829 (2011).
26
See generally Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble, Collateral Shareholder
Litigation Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1217
(2012); Roger M. Witten et al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery Controls in
Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64(3) THE BUSINESS LAWYER 691 (2009);
Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63(4) THE
BUSINESS LAWYER 1243 (2008).
27
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ECONOMIC IMPACT ON TARGETED FIRMS 1
(Law & Economics Center of George Mason University School of Law, June 2014).
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enforcement has led to the voluntary payment of heavy penalties by corporations in
order to settle these cases.
The harbinger of things to come is the Siemens AG case. In 2008, Siemens AG
signed a plea agreement with DOJ’s criminal division, as part of which it agreed to
pay $800 million to settle allegations of FCPA violations in multiple countries.28 A
year later, in 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) paid $579 million to the DOJ and
SEC to resolve a broad investigation of FCPA violations via a plea agreement.29 The
two largest FCPA enforcement actions in the history came roughly a decade later.
In 2017, Telia Company AB, a Swedish phone company, agreed to pay $965.8
million to settle through deferred prosecution agreement U.S. and European criminal
and civil charges that it paid bribes to win business in Uzbekistan.30 Then, in 2018,
Petrobras, Brazil's state energy company, entered into a non-prosecution
agreement with the DOJ that included a criminal penalty of $853.2 million, 31 in
addition to a related settlement with the SEC.

These enforcement actions have been heralded in lawmakers’ campaigns.
For example, in 2007, Mark F. Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the Fraud
Section of the DOJ’s Criminal Division, stated in his opening address at the
ACI (American Conference Institute) FCPA Conference that “2007 is by any

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty
to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined
Criminal
Fines
(December
15,
2008),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html ( “Coordinated
Enforcement Actions by DOJ, SEC and German Authorities Result in Penalties of $1.6
Billion.”).
29
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to
Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm-112.html; Press Release, SEC, SEC
Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm. To gain an idea of the scope of DOJ and
SEC investigations into FCPA cases, see Gibson Dunn, 2007 Year-End FCPA Update
(January 4, 2008), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2007-year-end-fcpa-update/ (hereinafter:
“Gibson Dunn-2007”). Gibson Dunn-2007 lists dozens of FCPA investigations in just 2007
alone.
30
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Telia Company AB and Its Uzbek Subsidiary
Enter Into a Global Foreign Bribery Resolution of More Than $965 Million for Corrupt
Payments in Uzbekistan (Sep. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telia-company-aband-its-uzbek-subsidiary-enter-global-foreign-bribery-resolution-more-965. The FCPA Top
Ten
List
is
available
at
the
FCPA
Blog
at
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/9/28/petrobras-smashes-the-top-ten-list-and-weexplain-why.html (last visited June 10, 2019).
31
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras Agrees to
Pay More Than $850 Million for FCPA Violations (Sep. 27, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/petr-leo-brasileiro-sa-petrobras-agrees-pay-more-850million-fcpa-violations.
28
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measure a landmark year in the fight against foreign bribery.”32 A year later,
at a speech he gave at an American Bar Association panel on foreign bribery
about the dramatic increase in the number of FCPA cases, he promised that
the trend will continue.33 Mendelson’s promise was echoed by Lanny Breuer,
the head of the DOJ Criminal Division, who made it clear in November of
2010, that “FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s ever been — and getting
stronger.”34
These were not empty words. In 2008 the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) created a unit dedicated to FCPA investigations;35 and in 2010 the SEC
also formed a specialized unit within its enforcement division to focus on
these cases.36 Finally, in November 2017, the DOJ published a new FCPA
Corporate Enforcement Policy intended to encourage companies to
voluntarily disclose misconduct and cooperate with enforcement
authorities.37
Chart 1 below illustrates this point regarding enforcement actions made by
the DOJ and the SEC of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, between 1978 and
2017:38

32

Gibson Dunn-2007, supra note 29 (describing that Frederic D. Firestone, an Associate
Director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, followed Mendelsohn’s words by saying
“ditto from the SEC”).
33
Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 CORPORATE
CRIME REPORTER 36(1) (September 16, 2008).
34
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the 24th National Conference
on
the
Foreign
Corrupt
Practices
Act
(Nov.
16,
2010),
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html (“We are in a new era
of FCPA enforcement; and we are here to stay.”).
35
FBI, Public Corruption, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/public-corruption.
36
Andrew Ceresney, Keynote Address at the International Conference on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013spch111913ac.
37
United States Attorney’s Manual 9-47.120 FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download.
38
Gibson Dunn, 2017 Year-End FCPA Update (January 2, 2018),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update/ (hereinafter: “Gibson Dunn2017”).
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A similar dynamic can be traced in the enforcement of the False Claims
Act (FCA).39 Recently, the FCA has become a major weapon in the arsenal
of the enforcement authorities.40 The act prohibits any person or organization
from defrauding the government on the material terms of its receipt of
government money or certification. FCA enforcement actions received public
attention, when, in 2009, the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3
billion to settle FCA civil and criminal allegations after Pfizer was accused
of promoting the sale of certain drugs that the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) refused to approve due to safety concerns. 41 In
emphasizing the magnitude of the penalties FCA infringers should expect to
face, Assistant Attorney General Tony West said, “[t]his civil settlement and
plea agreement by Pfizer represent yet another example of what penalties will
be faced when a pharmaceutical company puts profits ahead of patient
welfare.” 42 In the same year, global pharma company Eli Lilly paid $1.4
billion under the FCA to resolve a DOJ claim that it had violated the FCA by
39

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3733 (2012).
As Benjamin C. Mizer, the head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division announced
in December 2016, “Congress amended the False Claims Act 30 years ago to give the
government a more effective tool against false and fraudulent claims against federal
programs [and] [a]n astonishing 60 percent of those recoveries were obtained in the last eight
years.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (December 14, 2016).
41
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care
Fraud Settlement in Its History: Pfizer To Pay $2.3 Billion For Fraudulent Marketing (Sept.
2, 2009).
42
Id.
40
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illegally promoting one of its drugs for non-FDA uses, such as for treating
dementia, aggression, and generalized sleep disorder.43 Companies from the
healthcare sector remained the focus of the DOJ and in 2012, Abbott
Laboratories paid $1.5 billion to resolve criminal and civil FCA
investigations arising from its unlawful promotion of one of its drugs for nonFDA approved uses.44 Finally, in 2013, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay
$2.2 billion to settle FCA allegations that J&J promoted drugs for uses not
approved as safe and effective by the FDA.45 The rise in FCA enforcement
actions continues, as is evident from the fact that in 2017 alone the DOJ
recovered over $3.7 billion from FCA related investigations,46 and in 2018
alone the DOJ recovered over $2.8 billion.47 We do not expect this trend to
wane in the foreseeable future.
The Bank Secrecy Act, together with Anti-Money Laundering (AML)
laws, also provide a launching pad for enforcement actions. In this context,
the U.S. regulators have raised their efforts to ensure the compliance of
financial institutions with the Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of
Currency and Foreign Transaction Act of 197048 (commonly referred to as
the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws. This
campaign is led by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—
the Treasury’s lead agency for combatting money laundering. The SEC and
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) have also indicated
their intent to focus their resources on AML violations. 49 Naturally, the
primary targets of the aforementioned authorities are banks and depository
institutions. The enforcement actions were quick to come with large
settlements. In December 2012, HSBC Holdings plc entered into a deferred
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Eli Lilly Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to
Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009).
44
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve Criminal
& Civil Investigations of Off-label Promotion of Depakote (May 7, 2012).
45
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than $2.2 Billion to
Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov 4, 2013).
46
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017).
47
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018).
48
31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seg.
49
See SEC, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Examination Priorities
for 2017 (Jan. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examinationprogram-priorities-2017.pdf, at 4 (“Money laundering and terrorist financing continue to be
risk areas that are considered in our examination program.”); FINRA, 2017 Annual
Regulatory
and
Examination
Priorities
Letter
(Jan.
2017),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2017-regulatory-and-examination-prioritiesletter.pdf, at 8 (“In 2017, FINRA will continue to focus on firms’ anti-money laundering
programs, especially those areas where we have observed shortcomings.”).
43
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prosecution agreement, under which it agreed to pay a total amount of $1.2
billion, in addition to $665 million civil penalties, to regulators including the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the
Treasury Department.
On February 12, 2018, U.S. Bancorp (“USB”) and the Office of the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York entered into a DPA.50 The DPA
resolved criminal charges against USB, consisting of two alleged violations of the
Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) by USB’s subsidiary, U.S. Bank National Association,
for willfully failing to maintain an adequate anti-money laundering program and
willfully failing to file a Suspicious Activity Report. The DPA specified that USB
would pay the United States $528 million.
Between January 2002 and December 2015, 76.3% of AML/BSA
enforcement cases were directed at banks and depository institutions.51 In the
years since the financial crisis of 2008, the world’s biggest banks have been
fined $321 billion.52
It certainly appears as if AML/BSA enforcement is going to remain at the
forefront of the U.S. legislative and regulatory priorities in coming years.
Recently, Congress has shown interest in updating AML laws by proposing
multiple new bills53 and engaging in a number of discussions.54 Similar to the
examples of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the False Claims Act
discussed above, the Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering are
classic examples of a law and regulation that are focused on specific
industries.
B. Pretrial Diversion Agreements

50

Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 18-cr-150 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
12, 2018), [hereinafter U.S. Bancorp DPA]; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan
U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against U.S. Bancorp for Violations of the Bank Secrecy
Act (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announcescriminal-charges-against-us-bancorp-violations-bank.
51
Dr. Sharon Brown-Hruska, Developments in Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money
Laundering Enforcement and Litigation, NERA Economic Consulting 4 (June 2016),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/PUB_Developments_BSA_AM
L_Lit-06.16.pdf,
52
Gavin Finch, World’s Biggest Banks Fined $321 Billion Since Financial Crisis,
BLOOMBERG (March 2, 2017).
53
See,
e.g.,
H.R.
4373,
115th
Cong.
(2017),
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr4373/BILLS-115hr4373ih.pdf; S. 1241, 115th Cong.
(2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/s1241/BILLS-115s1241is.pdf.
54
See, e.g., Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance:
Opportunities to Reform and Strengthen BSA Enforcement: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Banking, Housing
& Urban
Affairs,
115th Cong.
(Jan.
9, 2018),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/combating-money-laundering-and-other-formsof-illicit-finance-opportunities-to-reform-and-strengthen-bsa-enforcement.
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1. The Growth in the Use of PDAs
As explained above, over the last two decades, the number of corporate
criminal investigations has increased exponentially. As noted by Jennifer
Arlen and Marcel Kahan, “corporate criminal enforcement in the United
States has undergone a dramatic transformation,” 55 and the enhanced
enforcement efforts brought about a corresponding increase in the number of
PDAs.56 A related explanation for the rise in the use of the PDAs focuses on
the Thompson Memo released by the DOJ in 2003, which instructed federal
prosecutions to defer prosecution if corporations agreeing to cooperate fully
with investigations led by the DOJ, or its agents, “including, if necessary, the
waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection.”57
Lastly, the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2005, as a consequence of the
criminal legal proceedings against it, 58 also explains how PDAs have
“skyrocketed” since 2005. 59 Chart 2 below illustrates the growing use of
PDAs over the last decade:60

55

Arlen & Kahan, supra note 5, at 324.
Recall, that PDAs include both Non Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs). The main difference between them is that whereas a DPA
involves the filing of charges in federal court, a NPA does not. See Cindy R. Alexander &
Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An Empirical Perspective
on Non-Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 545 (2015).
57
See Memorandum from Dep. Atty. Gen. Larry Thompson to United States Attorneys:
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003). See also infra
notes 129–130.
58
See infra notes 95–97.
59
Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1385, 1407 (2011).
60
Gibson Dunn, 2018 Year-End update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2018-yearend-npa-dpa-update/ (hereinafter: “Gibson Dunn-2018”). See also Gideon Mark, Private
FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L. J. 419, 434-5 (2012) (“[I]n the 21st century the use of
DPAs ‘has evolved rapidly to the point that they are now the primary tool in DOJ’s efforts
to combat corporate crime.’”).
This trend is not unique to the U.S. See Peter Reilly, Sweetheart Deals, Deferred
Prosecution, and Making a Mockery of the Criminal Justice System: U.S Corporate DPAs
Rejected on Many Fronts, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1140 (2019) (describing the growing use
of PDA in other countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom). See also
Samuel Rubenfeld, U.K. to Move Forward with Deferred-Prosecution Agreements, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruptioncurrents/2012/10/23/uk-tomove-forward-with-deferred-prosecution-agreements/.
56
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Instead of prosecuting cases to a final judgment, enforcement authorities
have displayed a preference to enter into PDAs with public companies. 61
Under these pretrial agreements, corporations agree to admit to wrongdoing,
pay considerable amounts, sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars, 62
undertake various corrective measures to prevent future lapses in compliance,
and in exchange, have the prosecution against them deferred for a certain
period of time. If the agreement was performed at the end of that period, the
prosecution will be dropped.63
Former head of the DOJ Lanny A. Breuer stated that DPAs had “become a mainstay
of white collar criminal law enforcement.” Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t
of Justice, Address at the New York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-newyork-city-bar-association (last visited June 22, 2019). See also Koehler, supra note 16, at
515-527 (describing the dominant use of DPAs and NPAs in FCPA enforcement); Julie R.
O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporations” Charging
Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the Purposes of the
Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 77 (2014) (“The biggest change in
corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years has been the plunge in criminal
convictions of large organizations, and the DOJ’s consistent use of [deferred prosecution]
agreements to dispose of criminal wrongdoing.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (2007).
62
Gibson Dunn-2018, supra note 60 (showing how in 2018, in the U.S., “the monetary
recoveries skyrocketed to nearly $8.1 billion”).
63
Rachel Delaney, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 875, 878 (2009).
61
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The company under investigation and the enforcement authority,
typically the DOJ, usually enter into the agreement following an internal
investigation led by the company itself with the assistance of a leading audit
firm64 approved by the DOJ, which makes a forensic examination to validate
the data obtained from the company’s sources. In some cases, the DOJ forces
the company to nominate an external monitor to supervise the collection and
analysis of the data. This process includes the collection and review of
thousands of documents and emails, and, in some cases, millions of pages of
documents produced and submitted to the DOJ. Within this process, the
company must collect and translate multiple documents, conduct internal
interviews, and make representations reflecting the result of the internal
investigation to the DOJ. After completing the negotiation, a PDA will be
signed.
PDAs characteristically impose burdensome requirements on companies,
including the establishment of a sophisticated and comprehensive
compliance program,65 high-level personnel changes such as termination of
high, mid, and low level officers,66 business changes,67 and the appointment
of an external corporate monitor approved by the enforcement authority for
the probation period (usually 24 to 36 months).68
Also, PDAs include a statement of facts in which the company admits to
the offence that it is accused of in a very detailed manner.69 The admissions
included in agreements are described by Richard Epstein as “confessions of

Typically, the audit company will be one of the “big four,” namely, Deloitte, Ernst &
Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).
65
Arlen & Kahan, supra note 5, at 342 (pointing out that “from 2008 to 2014,
approximately 82 percent of the PDAs entered into by the DOJ Criminal Division or the US
Attorneys’ Offices imposed compliance program mandates . . . .”).
66
Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993-2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 34
(2014) (found that out of 271 PDAs executed between 1993 and 2013, 30 percent mandated
changes in senior management).
67
Id (found that out of 271 PDAs executed between 1993 and 2013, 30 percent
mandated business changes).
68
Arlen & Kahan, supra note 5, at 342 (showing that “from 2008 to 2014 . . . more than
30 percent [of the PDAs entered into by the DOJ Criminal Division or the US Attorneys’
Offices] imposed outside monitors . . . .”). See also Alexander & Cohen, supra note 56, at
545; Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail Effect” and the Impact on
the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1311–12,
1320 (2014); Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 61, at 898; Vikramaditya
Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105
MICH L. REV. 1713, 1720-26 (2007); Veronica Root, The Monitor-"Client" Relationship,
100 VA. L. REV. 523 (2014).
69
Arlen & Kahan, supra note 5, at 334.
64
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a Stalinist purge trial.”70 The company must state that the facts set forth in
the statement of facts are “true” and “accurate” and agree that it shall not,
through its attorneys, employees or other agents, make any public statement,
in litigation or otherwise, contradicting the statement of facts, as long as they
speak on behalf of the company.71
The consequences for the directors and officers implicated in the
investigation are far reaching and dire. Naturally, the admissions made by the
company affect them. To be sure, the admissions of the company do not
formally bind the directors and officers, but the attribution of wrongful
actions and omissions to corporate officers have profound implications for
their career. If the investigation focuses on the acts and omissions of current
directors and officers, they can affect to some degree the admissions made by
the corporation about their actions or omissions. If, however, the
investigation concentrates on the actions and omissions of past directors and
officers, they have absolutely no influence on the admissions made by the
company. They are not directly involved in the negotiations leading to the
PDA and have no say in the process. We will discuss the ramifications of this
reality to corporate law and theory in Part III.A.
2. The Pressure to Settle
At this point, readers may wonder why powerful corporations sign PDAs.
PDAs are essentially plea bargains. 72 There exists a voluminous literature
that explains the motivation of individuals to enter plea bargains. Many
individual defendants simply do not have the financial resources to fight the
charges facing them. Corporations, especially public ones, clearly do not
have this problem. So why sign? Although it is true that in the typical case
corporations have superior financial resources to individuals, one cannot infer
from this fact that corporations can afford a prolonged legal battle against the
state or that it is in their best interest to do so. For the reasons we will explain
below, corporations, too, have a very strong incentive to settle. It is no
accident that a considerable number of criminal investigations against
corporations end in an agreement.
Corporations have a clear preference to enter into a PDA with the
enforcement authorities due to a combination of legal and economic reasons.
70

Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J. Nov. 28, 2006
(“The agreements often read like the confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as battered
corporations recant their past sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of any
underlying offense. . . . [Their use] erodes the most elementary protections of the criminal
law, by turning the prosecutor into judge and jury, thus undermining our principles of
separation of powers.”).
71
Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 925 (2009).
72
For a detailed discussion of the differences between PDAs and plea agreements, see
Section II.B.3.
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Begin with the legal reasons, imposing criminal liability on a corporation is
easier than successfully prosecuting individuals. Unlike the case with
individuals where all elements of the offense must be performed by one
individual, in the case of corporations, the elements may be provided by
different corporate agents. As a consequence, a corporation can be charged
with a criminal offense even if none of its employees can be accused of the
offense. The law employs two doctrines to create this result. First and
foremost, when the DOJ chooses to charge a company with a violation of a
federal statute, it is going to largely rely on the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Under this doctrine, the company may be found liable for acts of its
employees if they were acting within the scope of their authority at least in
part for the benefit of the corporation.73
This doctrine has been construed in a very broad manner by the courts.
First, the respondeat superior doctrine enables the imposition of liability on
the company, regardless of the position of the employee who violated the
law.74 Second, under this doctrine, a company may be held liable “even if an
employee is violating express corporate policy.”75 Third, the requirement that
the employee acted within the scope of his authority has been “defined to
mean ‘in the corporation's behalf in performance of the agent's general line
of work,’ including ‘not only that which has been authorized by the
corporation, but also that which outsiders could reasonably assume the agent
would have authority to do.’" 76 Fourth, when examining whether the
employee acted with the intent to benefit the company, it is the intent that
matters, rather than the actual benefit for the company.77 Interestingly, it is
no defense that the employee acted primarily for his personal benefit, 78
except when it could be proven that the employee acted exclusively for his
own benefit.79
The second doctrine that may be used by the DOJ is the collective
knowledge doctrine. This doctrine makes it possible to impose criminal
73
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909);
United States v. Singh, 518 F. 3d 236, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Potter, 463
F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Unites States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir. 1998);
Unites States v. Sun Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
74
Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5 th Cir. 1962)
(“[C]orporation may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even menial,
employees.”). See also U.S. v. Dye Const. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975); U.S. v.
Ionia Management S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 309–310 (2d Cir. 2009).
75
City of Vernon v. S. California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1992).
76
U.S. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
77
U.S. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
78
U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 138 F.3d 961, 970–71 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
79
Standard Oil Co. of Tex. V. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1962); U.S. v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
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liability on corporations, even in cases where no individual has committed all
the components of the offense. 80 Under this doctrine, the knowledge and
conduct of multiple employees can be imputed, in aggregation, to the
company.81 In this way, courts can impose criminal liability on the company
even if no individual employee had the mens rea necessary to prove the
offense.82 Taken together, the responeat superior doctrine and the collective
knowledge doctrine make companies much more vulnerable to criminal
convictions, compared to individuals.83
The business reasons to sign a PDA are even weightier. Once the
company is accused of violating the law, not to mention convicted, it must
invariably expend valuable resources on the investigation and incur
significant losses. The expenses accumulate as the investigation continues.
Hence, the company has an inherent incentive to close the investigation.
The opening of an investigation requires the firm to allocate managerial and
legal resources to the matter. The investigation comes on top of the
company’s standard business, which means that the company must employ
its human capital in a different way to address the exigencies posed by the
investigation.84 But this is only the beginning of the company’s ordeal.
Because enforcement authorities condition entering into a settlement on
full cooperation on the part of the company, and give companies credit for
cooperating with the investigating authorities, which comes in the form of a
reduced fine, corporations have a strong incentive to pay law firms to conduct
80
United States v. Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855–856 (1st Cir. 1987);
United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. W.Va. 1974).
81
Id. (“Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those components
constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether
employees administering one component of an operation know the specific activities of
employees administering another aspect of the operation.”).
82
Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 114–115 (2006).
83
Developments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1248 (1979) (“Thus, proving that a corporate
defendant committed the illegal act is in practice substantially easier than an individual
prosecution. Courts have also found the requirement of corporate criminal intent satisfied
where no agent's criminal intent has been shown. Corporations have been convicted of crimes
requiring knowledge on the basis of the ‘collective knowledge’ of the employees as a group,
even though no single employee possessed sufficient information to know that the crime was
being committed.”).
84
See, e.g., Olaf Storbeck, Deutche Bank Investors Fear Criminal Probe Will Hinder
Turnaround, FINANCIAL TIMES (December 3, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/03d9685cf632-11e8-af46-2022a0b02a6c (“Investors in Deutche Bank are concerned that the criminal
investigation into the suspected money laundering activities of the lender’s wealth
management unit will make it harder for chief executive Christian Sewing to execute his
crucial turnaround agenda.”).
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an internal investigation within the firm and report the findings to the DOJ or
SEC. 85 Since firms are under enhanced scrutiny at this point, they must
ensure that the internal investigation is comprehensive and uncompromising.
Firms are expected to provide full access to privileged materials, even those
that come under the attorney-client privilege,86 and align “their interests with
those of” DOJ or SEC’s attorneys.87
In global companies, the cost of conducting the said investigation runs in
hundreds of millions of dollars.88 If ultimately no agreement is reached with
the enforcement authorities, the resources spent on the investigation will be
wasted. Hence, once a decision on an internal investigation is made, the
company will try its best to sign a PDA.
In addition to the direct costs of the investigation, criminal enforcement
inflicts indirect costs on firms in the form of reputational harm, 89 loss of

85

See, e.g., MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 183
(2014) (“The above general framework best demonstrates the ‘carrots’ embedded in the
[Sentencing] Guidelines . . . In short, a company subject to FCPA scrutiny will receive a
lower culpability score based on voluntary disclosure, cooperation and acceptance of
responsibility, which then yields a lower multipliers, which then yields a lower fine range.”).
The dynamic described by Professor Koehler is relevant not just related to FCPA
investigations but to all investigations. See also Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation
and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 316–18 (2007)
(describing the approach of enforcement authorities, which leads to a very tight relationship
between calculation of fines and the level of cooperation provided by companies, as “carrots”
and “sticks”).
86
Infra notes 129–130.
87
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance:
An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2015)
(explaining how AIG cooperated with the then New York Attorney General Mr. Eliot
Spitzer).
88
See supra note 15.
89
See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 61, at 855
(“Organizations feared the catastrophic punitive fines and severe reputational consequences
of a conviction—what one court described as a ‘matter of life and death’”). See also Jonathan
M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43
J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 581 (2008) (examining 585 companies that were targeted by the SEC
enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978 through 2002 and revealing
that these companies lose 38 percent of their market value after news of their misconduct
was reported); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, J. L. & Econ. 757, 759 (1993) (using data on 132
cases of corporate fraud between 1978 and 1987 to find that the loss in value of common
stock of affected companies after “initial press reports of allegations or investigations of
corporate fraud against . . . government agencies . . . is 5.05 percent, or $40.0 million.”);
David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MARYLAND L. REV. 1295, 1335–6 (2013) (“. . .
Perhaps most significantly of all, criminal prosecution has a stigmatizing effect . . . .” ).
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business opportunities and an increased civil litigation risk. 90 The first two
costs are distinct, but related. A criminal investigation can irreversibly tarnish
the reputation of a firm, causing it to lose much of its hard-earned goodwill.
It creates a cloud of doubt that hovers over the operation of the firm, making
it difficult for the firm to attract new capital and to maintain its client base.91
The constant press coverage that accompanies the investigation often
augments the concerns about the stability of the company and casts doubt on
its future.92 This, in turn, makes it harder for the company to pursue new
business opportunities. It also forces the company to funnel resources into the
maintenance of business relationships. Once word of the investigation goes
out, financial institutions, suppliers, employees and business partners that
depend on the suspect firm will seek additional information about its future
and may demand assurances of its long-term sustainability.93 In parallel, they
may pursue other business opportunities that they deem safer.94
An often-cited example that demonstrates these threats is the case of
Arthur Andersen.95 The story began in 2002, when Andersen was charged
90
See Greenblum, supra note 11, at 1885 (“Collateral consequences facing corporations
convicted of a felony are perhaps just as diverse, though more detrimental, than those that
attach to individuals. Corporations can be debarred from government contracting and have
their professional license revoked.”). See also Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur,
Corporate Criminal Prosecution In a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo In Theory
and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1165 (2006) (“‘For health care providers . . . who
rely extensively on federal programs for reimbursement, exclusion is the equivalent of a
corporate death penalty.’ The authority to impose this powerful sanction lies with the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services’ Office of Inspector General . . . . Because a
number of health care convictions trigger mandatory exclusion, companies facing criminal
investigation in this [healthcare] industry necessarily focus on this derivative danger.”).
91
See Uhlmann, supra note 89, at 1264 (“Reputational harm can discourage investment
in a company”).
92
See Jamie L. Gustafson, Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime: An Analysis of the
Recent Trend of Severe Sentences for Corporate Officers, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685, 697
(2007) (“[P]ublic interest in corporate scandal spiked as a result of the media coverage.”).
Moreover, such an increase in public attention has been translated into an “understanding,
thoughtful outcry against white-collar crime.” Jonathan D. Glater, Mad as Hell: Hard Time
for
White-Collar
Crime,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
28,
2002)
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/28/weekinreview/ideas-trends-mad-as-hell-hard-timefor-white-collarcrime.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=5A73D4320BBB42965489EFA5A8070E28&
gwt=pay.
93
Koehler, supra note 16, at 510 (“A criminal investigation and indictment alone could
have enormous adverse consequences even if a company were ultimately acquitted at trial.”)
94
See id., at 1264-65 (“Reputational harm also can hamper relationships in the broader
business community.”)
95
See Cindy A. Schipani, The Future of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate
Criminal Investigations, 34 DEL. J. CORP. 921, 925-927 (2009). See also Elizabeth K.
Ainslie, Indicting Corporation Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43
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with a count of obstruction of justice, related to its auditing of Enron.
Andersen was accused of destroying documents in order to impede the
investigation of Enron, which was led by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The district court convicted Andersen and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Finally, in 2005 the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed Andersen’s conviction, but it
was too late. In 2002, Andersen lost its Certified Public Accountants’ license
(since the SEC does not accept audits from convicted firms), and in 2005,
although the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, Andersen had no chance
to reclaim its title of one of the “big five” accounting firms. 96 The dire
consequences of the investigation and conviction were described in 2002 by
Eric Holder, who served as the Attorney General of the United States between
2009 and 2015:
“Nevertheless, for a firm that trades on its
reputation, and that was already facing an
exodus of clients, the effect of the indictment
and conviction was close to a death sentence.
Thousands of innocent employees now find
themselves out of jobs and, for no good reason,
their professional reputations scarred. The
survival of Andersen itself is in great doubt. Is
this an appropriate outcome? I'm not sure.”97
The story of Arthur Anderson demonstrates why entering into a PDA with
the enforcement authorities as quickly as possible is the top priority of firms.
Companies under a criminal investigation must strive to reach a settlement at
all cost; waiting is simply not a viable option for most firms, even if it can
ultimately lead to acquittal. The market reaction to a criminal investigation
against a firm can be harsher than any legal punishment it may face. Dragging
out the investigation is a losing strategy from every aspect. The longer the
investigation, the higher the price for a company in terms of lost business
opportunities. All the while, the legal expenses continue to add up. Hence,
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 109 (2006); Golumbic & Lichy, supra note 68, at 1306-8; Peter J.
Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: R.I.P.?, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 312, 314
(2007); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The
Department of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 14-15 (2006).
96
Id.
97
Eric Holder, Don't Indict WorldCom, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at A14. See also
Alex B. Heller, Corporate Death Penalty: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Indictment of
SAC Capital, 22 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 763, 763-64 (“In Andersen’s case, the indictment
alone was a corporate death sentence, even before adjudication. The Anderson case and the
lessons learned in its aftermath have been regarded as a turning point in government
decisions to charge corporate offenders, especially in the financial services industry.”).
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the company faces a reality in which its resources are dwindling, while its
expenses are mounting.
From both perspectives, the best response to a criminal investigation is to
strive to settle it expeditiously, almost at all cost. The alternative, as the story
of Arthur Anderson reminds us, may be the demise of the corporation. The
desire to settle makes perfect sense for the company, but for the reasons we
will explain in Section III below, it comes at a dear price for the individual
directors and officers.
3. Plea Agreements
Similar dynamics that characterize PDAs also arise, albeit to a lesser
extent, in the context of plea agreements.98 In parallel to the increase in the
use of PDAs, classic corporate plea agreements continue to be a useful tool
for enforcement authorities.99 The main difference between PDAs and plea
agreements is that under a plea agreement the defendant is convicted of a
crime, whereas under a DPA or an NPA, the defendant is not convicted of
any crime.100
Furthermore, there are additional differences, as well. First, courts have a
potentially more significant role in overseeing plea agreements. Granted,
both plea agreements and DPAs may require court approval. Yet, there is a
difference between a court’s role in reviewing DPAs and its role in evaluating
plea agreements. As stated by Judge Srinivasan of the D.C. Circuit in the
famous case of Fokker: “the context of a DPA is markedly different. Unlike a plea
agreement—and more like a dismissal under Rule 48(a)—a DPA involves no formal
judicial action imposing or adopting its terms.”101 It should be added that unlike
98

Alexander & Cohen, supra note 56, at 538.
Id., at 562 (reporting that 486 corporate criminal settlements were signed between
1997 and 2011 by the DOJ and public companies (or their affiliates), and 329 of these
settlements were plea agreements). See also Data & Documents, CORPORATE PROSECUTION
REGISTRY,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecutionregistry/browse/browse.html (set “U.S. Public Company?” field as “Yes” and then search
Disposition Type field for “DP,” “NP,” and “plea.”) (reporting that 361 corporate criminal
settlements were signed between 1992 and 2019 by federal agencies and public companies,
among which 167 are plea agreements).
100
See Greenblum, supra note 11, at 1869 (“A guilty plea [in plea bargaining] results in
a conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the offender had been
convicted in a trial.” (citation omitted)); Cindy R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does
Conviction Matter? The Reputational and Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE SERIES (Jennifer Arlen eds.,
2018), (“DPAs lack the stigmatizing effect of a corporate conviction”); Cindy R. Alexander
& Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Non-Prosecution of Corporations: Toward a Model of Cooperation
and Leniency, 96 N.C. L. REV. 859, 862 (2018) (“Because neither the NPA nor the DPA
entails the corporate defendant pleading guilty, we refer to them as non-plea settlements.”)
101
United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2016). See also,
Id. at 744-5 (“Whatever may be the precise contours of that authority of a court to confirm
99
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DPAs, NPAs, the other type of PDAs, do not require court approval and do
not come under judicial scrutiny at all, even though they too contain broad
admissions of guilt by firms. The weakened role of judicial oversight in PDA
takes away some of the bargaining power wielded by law enforcement
authorities in negotiations of plea agreements.102
Second, in the case of plea agreements, some or much of the fact finding
is done by the court, depending on the stage at which the plea agreement is
entered. This may ameliorate the tendency of enforcement agencies to
attribute blame to a large group of directors and officers collectively and
indiscriminately, without even referring to them by name.
Third, indeed, both plea agreements and PDAs include factual admissions
and waiver of rights. Still, as reported by Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A.
Cohen in their empirical study, PDAs are more likely than plea agreements
to include requirements to waive privilege.103 Finally, “over 91% of DPAs
and 79% of NPAs are found to require an agreement to the admissibility of a
statement of facts and prior testimony or statements, compared to 38% of all
plea agreements.”104
Despite these differences, PDAs and plea agreements put companies
under enormous pressure to please the relevant enforcement authorities in
order to avoid a catastrophic result for the company. Toward this end,
corporations are willing to disregard the interests of present, especially past
employees, making them scapegoats for the company’s failure and not going
into the trouble of distinguishing among those who sinned and those who did
not. This gives rise to the reverse agency problem.
that a DPA's conditions are aimed to assure the defendant's good conduct, it does not permit
the court to impose its own views about the adequacy of the underlying criminal charges.”);
Criminal Law—Separation of Powers—D.C. Circuit Holds That Courts May Not Reject
Deferred Prosecution Agreements Based on the Inadequacy of Charging Decisions or
Agreement Conditions, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1055 (2017); James M. Anderson & Ivan
Waggoner, The Changing Role of Criminal Law in Controlling Corporate Behavior, THE
RAND CORPORATION 62 (2014), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR412.html
(“But because DPAs and NPAs are typically negotiated and executed prior to the indictment,
there is no judicial oversight over the terms of such agreements, so prosecutors do not have
to worry about the risk of a judge rejecting a plea agreement or the terms of probation.”);
Epstein, supra note 70 (“[DPA agreements can] turn[] the prosecutor into judge and jury,
thus undermining our principles of separation of powers.”); Peter R. Reilly, Corporate
Deferred Prosecution as Discretionary Injustice, UTAH. L. REV. 839, 871 (2017) (“district
courts have a long history of competently reviewing plea agreements.”). But see Darryl
Brown, The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV.
63 (2017) (explaining how judge play a passive role in approving plea agreements).
102
Reilley, supra note 101, at 869 (“in the context of a DPA, the prosecutor gets to
control all those checks and balances that in trials or plea agreements would be controlled by
judges, juries, and the watching public”).
103
Alexander & Cohen, supra note 56, at 587.
104
Id.

26

REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE

III.

[7-Aug-19

THE REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM

Companies’ desire to reach a settlement with enforcement authorities
gives rise to a hitherto unobserved phenomenon, which we call “the reverse
agency problem.” For the reasons we detailed in Part II, companies under a
criminal investigation are willing to sacrifice their directors and officers in
order to reach a quick settlement that will bring the investigation to a close.
The reverse agency problem is the mirror image of the famous managerial
agency problem identified by Berle and Means. Berle and Means observed
that the structure of public corporations allow directors and officers to
promote their narrow self-interest at the expense of the shareholders.105 This
insight has had an unparallel impact on corporate law scholarship and it is
undeniably correct for corporations in the ordinary course of business.
The opening of a criminal investigation against the firm gives rise to a
new agency problem. In order to save the corporation and its shareholders
from a long criminal prosecution process and a severe sanction at the end of
it, corporations are willing to admit to wrongdoing in order to cut their losses
and put the investigation behind them.106 En route to this result, corporations
are willing to attribute various acts and omissions to their directors and
officers, as required by the law enforcement agencies. We do not criticize this
behavior. It is perfectly rational. More importantly, settlements maximize
value for the shareholders.107 Yet, it comes at hefty price for the directors and
officers, and often other employees, who are expected to take one for the team
and live with the consequences of the settlement.
105

See discussion, infra, text accompanying note 114.
See Richard Cassin, What’s Wrong With Corporate Criminal Liability?, THE FCPA
BLOG (Jan. 7, 2009, 7:02 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/1/8/whats-wrong-withcorporate-criminal-liability.html (“That way, organizations threatened with criminal
prosecution might feel less compelled to rush into settlements with the DOJ that ‘sell out
individuals within the company.’”); Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John-Michael Seibler, All Stick and
No Carrot: The Yates Memorandum and Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 STETSON L. REV.
7, 31 (2016) (“[C]orporations have gone along with the government’s proposal because the
alternative—a conviction—can amount ‘to a virtual death sentence for business entities.’”).
107
Compare Cunningham, supra note 87, at 20 (explaining how “[f]rom the perspective
of economic theory, the adverse collateral consequences [of corporate conviction] are
essentially negative externalities, and DPAs are designed to avoid those.”), with the argument
that settlement under pressure may harm shareholders, such as Jenny Anderson, A.I.G. Is
Expected to Offer $1.6 Billion to Settle With Regulators, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2006) (last
visited June 20, 2019) (providing the statement of Howard Opinsky, a spokesman for
Maurice R. Greenberg, who served as the Chairman and CEO of AIG that settled in 2005
with the SEC for $1.6 Billion: “Shareholders lose when companies choose to settle
investigations motivated by political ambition, fueled by threats and settled out of fear …
Even if all the allegations were to be believed, a settlement of this magnitude is merely a
political trophy for the attorney general and totally disproportionate to the impact of the
alleged misconduct.”).
106

27

REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE

[7-Aug-19

As we will show, these consequences are severe. Critically, the
admissions implicating corporate officers should not be presumed to be
accurate. They are merely a means to secure a settlement with the law
enforcement authorities.108 The directors and officers who are subject to the
agreement and its statement of facts, often do not have a say in the negotiation
process and even when they do, their voices get muffled.109 The interest of
the shareholders takes precedence over the directors’ and officers’. For this
reason, we decided to dub this conflict of interest “the reverse agency
problem.” In the paragraphs to come, we will explore the effects of criminal
investigations, in general, and settlements, in particular, on corporate agents
and highlight the dynamics and costs resulting therefrom.
If the investigation results in an agreement or an indictment, the company
involved is likely to face demands from shareholders to file civil actions
against the directors and officers implicated in the investigation.110 The facts
stated in the agreement or in the indictment provide a fertile ground for the
filing of derivative suits against the directors and officers. After all, they
contain long and detailed descriptions of wrongdoing by the company’s
employees and managers, and oversight failure by the directors.
The company can respond to such demands in one of three ways. First, it
can accept them — at least in part — and bring actions against the relevant
directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary duties. Second, it can set
up a special litigation committee to investigate the matter and make
recommendations to the board of directors.111 Finally, it can refuse to take
any legal action against the directors and officers. Refusal to concede to these
demands invariably leads to the filing of derivative actions against the said
directors and officers.112
108

Section II.B.2.
Recall, again, how Professor Richard Epstein described the PDAs as “confessions of
a Stalinist purge trial.” Supra note 70.
110
See Westbrook, supra note 26, at 1227. See also Mark, supra note 60, at 446
(“Beginning in 2006 or so, the stepped-up enforcement of the FCPA by the DOJ and SEC
has sparked a corresponding increase in collateral civil litigation predicated on facts alleged
by the federal government in enforcement actions.”). It should be noted that sometimes the
mere announcement of a criminal investigation can trigger the filing of derivative actions.
111
See, generally, Minor Myers, The Decision of the Corporate Special Litigation
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309 (2009); C. N. V. Krishnan, Steven
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Study of Special Litigation
Committees (Mar. 2019),https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3053449.
112
Of course, there are also costs for the firm. Although the main target of derivative
actions are the directors and officers, not the company itself, they represent an unwelcome
development for the company. It must be understood that the filing of a derivative action
constitutes a serious distraction from the perspective of the company. If it is filed against
present directors and officers, it prevents them from focusing exclusively on the affairs of
the company. See supra note 84. Furthermore, since directors and officers are typically
109
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A. When Directors and Officers Come Second
It is impossible to overestimate the role of agency problems in corporate
law.113 There exists a broad consensus among theorists and lawmakers that a
principal goal of corporate law is to mitigate agency problems, first and
foremost those exist between shareholders and managers. In a landmark
contribution, Berle and Means noted that the separation between ownership
and management, the hallmark of modern corporations, presents many
advantages, but it also has a downside: it raises a risk that management would
transfer wealth from the shareholders to its members.114
Subsequently, scholars have pointed out the existence of other types of
agency problem, i.e., conflicts of interest that are endemic to corporations.
Another type of agency problem noted by corporate scholars is the tension
between shareholders and creditors, with the former who are residual value
claimants willing to take risks to maximize reward, while the latter who have
a fixed claim preferring a much lower level of risk, if any. 115 Then, scholars
observed a third type of agency problem that exists between majority
shareholders and minority shareholders. 116 This problem focuses on the
ability of majority shareholders to enrich themselves at the minority’s
expense by forcing management to play along with this plan. Finally, Ronald
Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon have identified yet another type of agency
problem that arises between institutional investors and standard shareholders.
In this case, the misalignment of interests arises from the different investment
strategies of the two groups and their willingness to actively engage the
management of companies in which they invest.117
Our goal is to add to the canon of agency problems by drawing attention
to the reverse agency problem that is gaining prominence in the compliance
age. The reverse agency problem arises in the context of the enforcement
actions against corporations. To reach an expedient resolution, corporations
are willing to accede to the demands of the law enforcement authorities.
Reaching a settlement is in the best interest of all parties involved. From the
vantage point of the law enforcement authorities, settlements save scarce
entitled to reimbursement of their legal expenses, it is the company that ends up footing the
legal bills. Finally, the filing of derivative actions further harms the reputation of the
company and hobbles its ability to do business.
113
See, e.g., Goshen & Squire, supra note 2, at 769 (“For the last forty years, the problem
of agency costs has dominated the study of corporate law and governance.”).
114
See references in supra notes 1–2.
115
John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 29-30 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3rd. ed., 2017).
116
Id., at 29-30. See also Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
& Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000).
117
See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 2.
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resources and allow the initiation of additional enforcement actions against
other firms. 118 From the perspective of firms, the sooner an investigation
ends, the better.
Settling the case means dramatic cost savings for the firm, relative to the
option of indictment. 119 It also frees up the company’s human resources,
allowing the company to focus exclusively on its business. 120 Finally, it
removes a cloud of uncertainty from the firm,121 and signals to the market
that the company has gotten back on track.122
The consequences of a settlement are very different for the company’s
employees and officers who were implicated in the investigation. The
opening of a criminal investigation is like the opening of a Pandora’s box: it
will certainly change the lives of the individual directors, officers and
employees implicated for the worse, by imposing two major costs on them.
First, their correspondence, documents and actions will be scrutinized and
analyzed for evidence of wrongdoing. Although this is a necessary measure,
it exposes the inner world of business organizations and the materials that
were presumed to be private.
United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.010. (“The major objectives of pretrial
diversion are . . . [T]o save prosecutive and judicial resources for concentration on major
cases”). See also Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor:
The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH L. REV. 1713, 1730 (2007); Brandon L. Garrett,
Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 901 (2007); Christie Ford & David Hess,
Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance? 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 680-1
(2009).
119
As Judge Kaplan stated in the case of KPMG: “Many companies faced with
allegations of wrongdoing and under intense pressure to avoid indictment, as an indictment—
especially of a financial services firm—threatens to destroy the business regardless of
whether the firm ultimately is convicted or acquitted.” U.S. v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315,
338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
120
See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 272 & n. 27 (1986); A.F. Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys
Fees, 47 L. CONT. PROB. 269, 271 (“A less conspicuous but equally immediate cost of the
derivative suit will be consumption of the time of the corporate officers and directors and
their staffs and their consequent diversion of their best efforts from production and
distribution.”). Interestingly, courts permit boards of public companies and special litigation
committees appointed by the boards to take into account, when considering a demand for a
derivative suit, also the time that corporate managers and directors will spend if participate
in a trial. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
121
It is worth noting that “[I]n reality, it would almost never be possible to predict lost
business from reputational damage . . . .” David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings,
Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1254-5 (2016).
122
See Brandon Garett, International Corporate Prosecutions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS (Darryl K. Brown, Jenia I. Turner & Bettina Weisser eds.
2019) (“[R]epresentatives of companies sometimes also prefer a swifter conclusion to a case
to minimise the reputational risks to their corporation.”).
118
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The famous case of KPMG 123 is illustrative. In 2003, the DOJ launched
a criminal investigation against KPMG and many of its employees
concerning the designing, marketing and implementing of illegal tax shelters.
The DOJ took full advantage of KPMG’s vulnerability, pitting the company
against its own employees, as described at length in Judge Kaplan’s decision:
“The government took full advantage. It sought
interviews with many KPMG employees and
encouraged KPMG to press the employees to cooperate.
Indeed, it urged KPMG to tell employees to disclose
any personal criminal wrongdoing. When individuals
balked, the prosecutors told KPMG. In each case,
KPMG reiterated its threat to cut off payment of legal
fees unless the government were satisfied with the
individual's cooperation. In some cases, it told the
employees to cooperate with prosecutors or be fired.
The government obtained statements, commonly
known as proffers, from nine KPMG employees who
now are defendants here (the ‘Moving Defendants’). . .
Having considered the evidence, the Court is persuaded
that the government is responsible for the pressure that
KPMG put on its employees. It threatened KPMG with
the corporate equivalent of capital punishment. KPMG
took the only course open to it.”124
Judge Kaplan proceeded to state that the use of the Thompson Memo by
prosecutors has produced “the exertion of enormous economic power by the
employer upon its employees to sacrifice their constitutional rights.” 125
Ultimately, the court suppressed many of the statements made by the
individual employees of the KPMG, finding that they were obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.126
The case of KPMG is not an outlier or an isolated example; on the
contrary, it is highly representative of the DOJ’s policy. Eastern District of
New York Judge John Gleeson noted in the oft-cited case of HSBC that:
“Recent history is replete with instance where the
requirements of such cooperation have been alleged
and/or held to violate a company’s attorney-client
123

U.S. v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id., at 318 – 319.
125
Id., at 337.
126
Id., at 338.
124
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privilege and work product protections, or its
employees’ Fifth or Sixth Amendments rights.”127
This concern of violation of employees’ Fifth Amendments rights in the
context of criminal investigation within the firm has attracted also the
attention of the academia. 128 Legal counsels also voiced serious concerns
about the “culture of waiver” adopted by the DOJ. 129 The DOJ itself
acknowledged that:
“The Department's policy with respect to privilege
waivers became the subject of intense lobbying of
Congress by the defense bar and the business community
over the next few years. The American Bar Association,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National
Association of Manufacturers decried what they claimed
was a ‘culture of waiver,’ in which prosecutors almost

127

United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). Judge Gleeson added that: “[F]or nearly ten years – from 1999 to
2008 – the Department of Justice’s corporate charging policies, as articulated in the Holder,
Thompson, McCallum, and McNulty Memos, emphasized the importance of corporate
cooperation, including a willingness to waive the attorney-client and work product
protections[;]” that “The DOJ’s corporate charging policies, as articulated in the Holder and
Thompson Memos, also instructed federal prosecutors to consider the extent to which a
cooperating company makes witnesses available to the government [;]” and that “the DOJ’s
corporate charging policies, as articulated in the Holder and Thompson Memos, also
instructed federal prosecutors to consider a company’s advancing of legal fees to employees,
except as required by law, as potentially indicative of an attempt to shield culpable
individuals, and therefore a factor weighing in favor of indictment of the company.” Id., at
note 10–12.
128
See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1613, 1634-5 (2007) (“If firms are to require their agents to say what they know, some reason
must be given to induce the agent to speak. The reason can only be what rests within the
firm’s control: denial of the compensation or employment that the firm confers upon the
employee.”); T.H. Waters III, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: An Examination of a
‘Costly’ Right to Silence for Corporate Employees in Criminal Investigations, 25 REV. LIT.
603, 605-6 (2006) (“The leverage gained from the corporation's compliance forces the
employee to cooperate or risk losing her job.”).
129
Statement of the Coalition to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege, Submitted to the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Regarding Hearings on Coerced Waiver of the AttorneyClient Privilege: The Negative Impact for Clients, Corporate Compliance, and the American
Legal System (September 12, 2006) (“Almost 75% of both inside and outside counsel who
responded to this question expressed agreement (almost 40% agreeing strongly) with a
statement that a ‘culture of waiver’ has evolved in which governmental agencies believe it
is reasonable and appropriate for them to expect a company under investigation to broadly
waive attorney-client privilege or work product protections.”).
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immediately demanded privilege waivers upon initiation
of an investigation.”130
Second, the opening of a criminal investigation casts a heavy shadow on
the integrity and reputation of the board and management of the suspect firm.
This effect is unavoidable. The moment an investigation is announced, the
directors and top managers have to deal with a whirlwind of rumors and
suspicions that are kept alive by constant media coverage, as well as stories
on blogs and social media.131 These rumors and suspicions cannot be easily
set aside or disproved.132
It is important to understand that the announcement of an investigation
marks the beginning of the Via Dolorosa of the individuals implicated.
Naturally, the investigation may lead to three possible outcomes: a finding of
no wrongdoing, a settlement, or an indictment. Needless to say, the best

130
James McMahon, Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 64 UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY’S BULLETIN 1, 3 (July 2016). As the bulletin explains, “[w]ith the August
2008 release of the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations—known
informally as the Filip Memo—federal prosecutors, under most circumstances, are no longer
permitted to ask a cooperating corporation or entity to waive its attorney-client or work
product privileges as part of its cooperation.” Id., at 1. However, in 2015, the DOJ issued the
Yates Memo, which requires a company to disclose “all relevant facts relating to the
individuals responsible for the misconduct” for the company “to be eligible for any
cooperation credit.” Yates Memo, supra note 8. See also Gideon Mark, The Yates
Memorandum, 51 UC DAVIS 1589, 1602 (2018) (“Nevertheless, the consensus of the defense
bar was that the Filip Memorandum did not cure the waiver problem created by prior
Memoranda, with the result that counsel would often be forced to risk waiver in order to
avoid an adverse DOJ action.”).
131
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 INDIANA L.
J. 473, 501 (2006) (“Upon observing an instance of entity fault for criminality, persons may
be less willing to contract with, employ, and rely upon individuals known to have
contributed, in some way at least, to the formation of institutional conditions that produced
that criminality.”). See also Id., at 502 (“The extent of both of these effects of reputational
sanction on a firm is likely to vary according to a given individual's position within the
organization. The more senior and responsible a person . . . the more likely that others will
conclude that the message of firm fault conveys something significant about the
individual.”).
132
See Jonathan M. Karpoff; John R. Jr. Lott, The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 792 (1993) (finding that companies
charged with defrauding customers and other stakeholders have lower operating earnings
over the following five years). In fact, practitioners have designed complicated strategies to
the difficulty of dealing with potential reputational loss following the announcement of an
investigation. See, e.g., Kevin Bailey & Charlie Potter, Protecting Corporate Reputation in a
Government Investigation, Global Investigations Review (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/chapter/1079418/protecting-corporate-reputationin-a-government-investigation.
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possible option from the vantage point of the company and its employees is
the first one. Unfortunately, very few investigations have a happy ending.133
Hence, a settlement or an indictment is a much more realist outcome.
For the reasons we discussed in Part I, a considerable number of
investigations end in a settlement. As a part of the settlement, the company
makes a series of admissions of wrongdoing, which it cannot renounce. It
must also sign a statement of facts that is appended to the settlement
agreement. The statement, too, contains a long and detailed enumeration of
factual findings, which the firm is not allowed to dispute, deny or challenge,
lest the agreement be rescinded. Frequently, the statements of facts describe
the wrongdoing of the company, its managers, and its directors in very strong
language stating that they “knowingly” and “willfully” violated the law, or
“knowingly” failed to implement and maintain controls to address known
risks.
Critically, since firms are artificial entities, they cannot commit the
elements of the criminal offenses attributed to them on their own; they must
operate through human agents. It is the actions and mindsets of the
corporation’s employees that establish the actus reus and mens rea of the
offenses of which the corporation is accused. Accordingly, settlement
agreements and statement of facts attribute various illegal actions, omissions,
states of minds and intents to various agents of the firm.134 At the end of the
process, the DOJ issues a press release describing in great detail the terms of
the agreements and the confession made by the corporation.
It must be emphasized at this point that the number of individual
employees involved in a criminal investigation can be very high. When
striving to finalize an agreement and collect a significant fine, law
enforcement authorities do not typically dwell on the wording. Nor does the
company under investigations. 135 Both parties are interested in a quick
133

Based on data retrieved from the Corporate Prosecution Registry, a database that
provides comprehensive and up-to-date information on federal organizational prosecutions
in the United States, out of the 3429 criminal investigations conducted on corporations
(among which 383 were on public corporations) between 1992 and 2019, only 179 resulted
in acquittal, dismissal, or declination (among which 19 were on public corporations). Data
&
Documents,
CORPORATE
PROSECUTION
REGISTRY,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html
(search Disposition Type field for “All,” “acquittal,” “dismissal,” and “declination.”).
134
See Gibson Dunn-2017, supra note 38, at 3 (“Most NPAs and DPAs require a clear
acknowledgement by the company that the statement of facts is ‘true and accurate,’ and that
the company bears responsibility for the actions of officers, directors, employees and agents
acting on its behalf.”).
135
Koehler, supra note 16, at 554 (“Prosecutors have far less leverage over individuals.
People, unlike corporations, often face the prospect of incarceration and financial ruin in the
event of a criminal conviction. As a result, individuals are more likely to test the
government’s legal theories and version of the facts. . . . [P]rosecutors know from their
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resolution.136 The directors, officers and other employees get caught in the
middle.
Although corporations are willing to sacrifice both former and present
employees to reach a settlement, there is an important difference between its
treatments of the two groups. While present employees can have an indirect
and limited input on the negotiations leading to the agreement, former
employees are excluded from the process altogether. A clarification is in
order here. As we discussed, the investigation is often conducted by external
law firms and consultants that are hired for this purpose. Past and present
employees, who are relevant to the investigation, are interviewed in the
course of the investigations. Hence, they receive an opportunity to share their
versions of what happened. Thereafter, they leave the floor to the attorneys
to negotiate and draft the terms of the settlement agreement, including the
exact wording of the statement of facts. Present directors and officers must
approve the agreement on behalf of the corporation. Hence, they have an
opportunity to review the draft and introduce very marginal changes to the
wording, but they cannot realistically achieve more than this as the bargaining
power lies with the law enforcement authorities.
This is especially true given that although the final version of the
agreement is provided to the board of directors for review only a few days
before the date of signing. Although directors review the agreement before
its approval, they are not involved, in any way, in the preparation of the
agreement. Furthermore, when a settlement is presented to the board, the
board faces a binary choice: approve or else the DOJ will reopen the case and
even broaden the investigation to cover larger time periods and additional
countries in which the company did business.
Past employees are in worse shape. Their approval of the agreement is
not required. They do not get a chance to review the agreement, nor do they
receive an opportunity to comment on it. Worse yet, the present directors and
officers have a strong economic motivation to settle expeditiously regardless
of the ramifications for past employees. After all, they are eager to put the
criminal investigation behind them and they owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation, not to their predecessors.137
At this point, one might wonder: why is all this problematic? if an
employee, current or former, committed a criminal offense, they should live
with the consequences, whether or not she was given a fair hearing. But
interactions with lawyers for individuals that, unlike with the corporation, they are likely to
have a fight on their hands if they bring charges.”).
136
Reilly, Sweetheart Deals, supra note 60, at 1120 (explaining how the DPAs “can be
a means to: speedy and efficient dispute resolution”).
137
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“Corporate officers and directors . .
. stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.”).
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therein lies the rub: many individual directors and officers have not violated
the law and cannot be assumed to have done so. It is critical to understand
that even though the liability of a corporation is based on the acts, omissions,
intent and mental states of its officers and employees, it is much easier to
assign criminal liability to a corporation than to its individual employees. 138
As we explained earlier, a corporation may be found guilty of criminal
misbehavior even when none of its employees committed a criminal offense
on her own. While in the case of individual liability, all the elements of a
criminal offense must be performed by one person, in the case of corporate
liability it is possible to collect elements from different employees and
attribute them to the corporation.
Two important doctrines that are routinely used by law enforcement
authorities are responsible for this difference: the respondeat superior
doctrine and the collective knowledge doctrine.
The reponsdeat superior doctrine allows law enforcement authorities to
attribute the acts, omissions and intents of various individual employees,
including even low-level employees, to the corporation itself. On this theory,
the corporation is deemed vicariously liable for the misdeeds of its agents; all
individual wrongs, even if they do not suffice to establish personal liability,
are channeled to the corporation, and, in the aggregate, they often suffice to
impose liability upon it.139
The collective knowledge doctrine enables law enforcement authorities
to rely on the collective knowledge of all the employees of a corporation in
order to find it guilty of a crime. Based on this doctrine, corporations have
been found to be criminally guilty in cases in which no single agent satisfied
the knowledge requirements necessary for a criminal conviction, but several
agents collectively satisfied these requirements.140
Accordingly, it is impossible to derive personal liability from the liability
of the firm. This is not merely a theoretical point: attempts by law
enforcement authorities to prosecute officers of corporations that admitted to
wrongdoing often result in acquittals. Furthermore, in many cases, it is not
even possible to impose civil liability on directors and officers pursuant to
settlements. 141 There is a gulf between corporate liability and personal
138

See supra note 83.
See supra notes 73-79.
140
See supra notes 80-82.
141
One famous example is the case of the oil and gas services company Tidewater Inc.
After the company resolved the FCPA investigation by signing a PDA, a derivative suit was
filed against Tidewater’s directors. The district court in Louisiana dismissed the suit, with a
conclusion that: “While Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to show that Tidewater was
evidently violating both the FCPA and the Exchange Act, nowhere in the Complaint do
Plaintiff’s allegations meet the specificity to show that the Individual defendants were acting
with the intent to violate these laws. The mere fact that the violation occurred does not
139
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liability. Yet, settlements are not sensitive to this fact. They are drafted in a
sweeping manner that pays no heed to the consequences for the individual
employees.
Indeed, from a purely legal perspective, the admissions and statements
made by corporations do not bind individual directors, officers and
employees. They do not constitute res judicata as far as personal liability is
concerned. However, from a practical perspective, the consequences for
individual employees are severe.
Employees who are covered by the PDAs do not have an opportunity to
disagree with the statements that were made about them. They cannot initiate
a legal proceeding to clear their name or even challenge the factual accuracy
of the statements that pertain to them. Their only chance to do so is when a
personal investigation is opened or if shareholders decided to bring derivative
actions against them. But even this opportunity is more illusory than real.
The broad and unequivocal admissions that are found in settlement and
statements of facts practically invite the filing of derivative actions against
the individuals who are mentioned in them. The signing of a settlement is
almost invariably a prelude to civil litigation that comes on its heels. 142
Plaintiffs in derivative actions base their prima facie case on the admissions
made by a company in its settlement with DOJ or other law enforcement
authorities.143
Plaintiffs often quote extensively from the admissions and findings in
settlement agreements which do not go to the trouble of carefully addressing
the potential personal liability of each individual director and officer, and the
claims made by derivative plaintiffs. The admissions and findings list all
directors, officers and other employees whose names were mentioned in the
annual reports of the company during the years described in the settlement
agreement as defendants and treat them as a monolithic group.
We will elaborate on this point later. Here, it is worth noting that private
plaintiffs have neither the capabilities nor the incentives to distinguish
between good directors and officers and bad ones. Private plaintiffs, who are
individual shareholders, have a very limited access to information about the
company and its officers and directors. 144 Furthermore, the plaintiffs are
frequently shareholders with a miniscule stake in the company, and therefore
demonstrate that the board acted in bad faith” Strong v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D.
La. 2012). As Professor Mike Koehler, a compliance expert, put it: “Not only was the
Tidewater derivative claim, representative of the type of derivative claims frequently brought
in the FCPA context, it was also representative of the outcome.” Mike Koehler, Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 391, 437 (2014).
142
See supra note 110.
143
Id.
144
ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 85–87
(Oxford U. Press, 2007).
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“ha[ve] very little incentive to consider the effect of the action on the other
shareholders” and the company as a whole.145
The directors and officers, who are listed as defendants, do not get a real
opportunity to exonerate themselves. As Professor Amy Westbrook puts it
more generally: “the majority of the recent shareholder derivative suits filed
in the wake of FCPA actions have been dismissed, a handful have settled, and
none have been fully litigated on the merits.”146
Thus, at the end of the day, the directors and officers who were implicated
in settlements do not have a real way to vindicate themselves. They have to
live with the admissions and statements of facts made by their corporations.
The ramifications for these individuals, who have done no wrong, are dire
and far-reaching. Their reputation is irremediably harmed, as is their future
employability and earning capacity.147 They have to deal with the financial
and emotional consequences of a long criminal investigation that is often
followed by civil litigation. All the while, they are being featured in
uncomplimentary media reports. Worst of all, no extant law gives them an
opportunity to set the record straight.
The population of top corporate executives can be characterized as a
small community. As Edward Rock has pointed out, "the senior managers
and directors of large, publicly held corporations, and the lawyers who advise
them form a surprisingly small and close-knit community. The directors of
large, publicly held corporations number roughly four to five thousand."148
Jayne Bernard further observed that “[i]n such a community, information
travels, impressions are formed and hardened, loyalties are tested, and
reputations are built and dismantled, extremely efficiently, often with just a
few phone calls. In a rarefied community such as this, the role of reputation
is significant.”149
Finally, the allegations of wrongdoing made with respect to directors and
other top officers may cause institutional investors to vote against the
145
Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative
Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271
(1986).
146
Westbrook, supra note 26, at 1228. See also Kevin LaCroix, FCPA Follow-On Civil
Actions: Frequently Filed, Less Frequently Successful (June 18, 2017),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/06/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/fcpa-followcivil-actions-frequently-filed-less-frequently-successful/
147
See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919 (1998) (noting that “while litigation is unlikely to cost
[corporate managers and directors] their jobs, liability can damage their reputations and
future careers”).
148
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997).
149
Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 959, 966 (1999).
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directors’ reelection150 or to act in order to fire other senior executives. Large
institutional investors have become involved in monitoring the compliance
of public companies, in which they invest, to laws and regulations.
B. The Pooling Effect
A root cause of the reverse agency problem is the collective treatment of
directors and officers in settlements and the insinuation and the attribution of
various elements of wrongdoing to them in order to establish the guilt of the
corporation on which they serve. A typical agreement begins with a statement
that the Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible
under Unites States law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and
agents. Later, the agreement describes in great detail how the company, via
the actions and omission of its managers and employees, broke the law on
during the time period covered by the agreement. The Agreement also
describes how directors failed to adopt and implement any adequate
compliance program, and how this failure enabled the wrongdoing.
As such, the agreement does not distinguish between law abiding and
diligent officers, directors and employees and their peers who broke the law
or breached their fiduciary duties. Moreover, no names are mentioned in
agreements; managers and directors are treated as an indistinguishable group.
Thus, a pooling equilibrium is created. To illustrate this point, we revisit
some of the largest agreements signed during the past few years, discussed in
Section II.A.
For instance, the plea agreement signed with Kellogg Brown & Root
(KBR) states that “Kellogg Brown & Root LLC admits, accepts, and
acknowledges that it is responsible for the acts of its predecessor companies'
officers, employees, and agents as set forth below.”151 Likewise, the DPA
that HSBC entered into, in the context of the Bank Secrecy Act, proclaims
that “The HSBC Parties admit, accept and acknowledge that they are
responsible for the acts of their officers, directors, employees, and agents . . .
.”152 Similar statements can be found in the agreements signed with Telia,153
150

Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate
Compliance, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), at 42–44.
151
Plea Agreement at 33, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 161 F. Supp. 3d 423
(E.D. Tex. 2015) (No. H-09-071) [hereinafter KBR Plea Agreement].
152
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. HSBC No. 12-CR-763, 2013
WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) [hereinafter HSBC DPA].
153
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, United States v. Telia Company AB, No. 1:17CR-00581-GBD
(S.D.N.Y.
2017)
https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/file/998601/download (“The Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is
responsible under Unites States law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and
agents as charged in the Information, and as set forth in the attached Statement of Facts, and
that the allegations described in the Information and the facts described in the attached
Statement of Facts are true and accurate.”).
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Petrobras,154 and USB. 155These examples are representative. The drafters of
the agreements intentionally keep the language broad and vague, imputing
potential responsibility to large groups of executives without distinguishing
among them.
It is noteworthy that some agreements contain language suggesting that
had the matter been litigated, the consequences for the company would have
been dire. For example, the agreement with KBR contains the following
clause: “Had this matter proceeded to trial, the United States would have
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, by admissible evidence, the facts alleged
in the Information.”156 The use of such statements sends a strongly negative
signal about the parties involved, suggesting that they managed to avoid a
sure criminal conviction.
As a matter of fact, the pooling effect discussed above takes place not
only in the agreements themselves. It begins much earlier at the moment an
investigation is announced. Once an investigation has been initiated, the
suspect company must issue an immediate report to notify the public of this
development. In addition, the company is legally obliged to mention the
ongoing investigation against it in quarterly and annual reports. These reports
persist over a long period of time. In 2016, the median duration of FCPA
enforcement actions was 4.25 years.157 During this time period, a gray cloud
hangs over all of the company’s directors and officers, 158 and a statute of

Non Prosecution Agreement Re: Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras (Sept. 26, 2018)
(“The Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible under Unites States
law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and agents as set forth in the attached
Statement of Facts, and that the facts described therein are true and accurate.”).
155
U.S. Bancorp DPA (Feb. 12, 2018), available at https://www.justice.gov/usaosdny/press-release/file/1035081/download (“USB stipulates that the facts set forth in the
Statement of Facts, attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein, are true and
accurate, and admits, accepts and acknowledges that it is responsible under United States
law for the acts of its current and former officers and employees as set forth in the Statement
of Facts”).
156
See, e.g., KBR Plea Agreement, supra note 151, at 33. See also HSBC DPA, supra
note 144 at 1 (“If this matter were to proceed to trial, the Department would prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, by admissible evidence, the facts alleged below and set forth in the
criminal Information attached to this Agreement.”).
157
THE GRAY CLOUD OF FCPA SCRUTINY LASTED TOO LONG IN 2016,
http://fcpaprofessor.com/gray-cloud-fcpa-scrutiny-lasted-long-2016/ (last visited July 11,
2019) [hereinafter THE GRAY CLOUD OF FCPA SCRUTINY].
158
Richard Cassin, The FCPA’s Long Shadow, THE FCPA BLOG (August 6, 2012),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/6/the-fcpas-long-shadow.html (“The threat of FCPA
enforcement after a company self reports casts a long shadow. It darkens the future for
management, shareholders, lenders, customers, and suppliers. Exactly the problem the
statute of limitations was supposed to fix.”).
154
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limitations is not going to help here.159 The public reports of the company
describe how the company is subject to a criminal investigation, and, in some
cases, reveal that the investigation identified certain practices and
transactions that likely constitute violations of law.
Finally, the pooling effect continues in formal publications made by
enforcement authorities. Typically, after an agreement is signed, the
enforcement authorities issue a press release that describes it in great detail.
The content of the publications resembles the language used in the
agreements and statements of facts. The enforcement authorities, for their
part, have no incentive to soften the harsh language of the agreements; on the
contrary, they want to send a clear and unequivocal message about the harsh
consequences of breaking the law to the rest of the market.
News about the agreement spreads fast. Publications made by authorities
focus on the large fines the companies agreed to pay, and the companies’
admissions. The large penalties draw enormous public attention to the
publications and readers are inevitably exposed to the admissions of guilt
referencing the management and board of the relevant companies, who are
once again referred to as a guilty group.
These publications aggravate the plight of innocent directors and officers,
adding an element of public shaming to their ordeal. This effect is accentuated
by the motivation of enforcement agents to aggrandize their own
achievements 160 in order to bolster their statutory enforcement powers. 161
This concern is exacerbated owing to the fact that publications by
enforcement agencies are subject to very few procedural safeguards, if any.162
When issuing a publication, enforcement authorities are generally not
required to give prior notice or an opportunity to the company or its agents to
be heard.163 At bottom, from the beginning of the investigation process until
As one commentator explained: “Statute of limitations are ordinarily the remedy the
law provides for legal gray clouds. Yet in corporate FCPA enforcement actions, the
fundamental black-letter legal principle of statute of limitations seems not to matter
because cooperation is the name of the game and to raise bona fide legal arguments such as
statute of limitations is not cooperating in an investigation. Given the ‘carrots’ and ’sticks’
relevant to resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions, one of the first steps a company
the subject of FCPA scrutiny often does to demonstrate its cooperation is agree to toll the
statute of limitations or waive any statute of limitations defenses.” THE GRAY CLOUD OF
FCPA SCRUTINY, supra note 157.
160
See Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era,
211 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1378 (2011).
161
See Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1380, 1398–1401 (1973).
162
Cortez, supra note 160, at 1374.
163
Id. at 1383. See also Gellhorn, supra note 161, at 1420 (“[U]sually no protection
other than the common sense and good will of the administrator prevents unreasonable use
of coercive publicity.”).
159
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its end, the executives of the suspect company are treated as a monolithic
group. Neither the companies nor the enforcement authorities have an
incentive to carefully differentiate among wrongdoers and innocent parties.
Both groups are pooled together.
C. The Near Irrelevance of Standard Defense Mechanisms to
the Reverse Agency Problem
Thus far, we have analyzed in great detail the adverse effect of the reverse
agency problem on corporate officers and employees, as is true of all agency
problems. The reverse agency problem makes it harder and more expensive
for corporations to hire good directors, managers and key employees. Of
course, directors and officers who strayed from the right path should be held
accountable for their decisions. As we emphasized time and again throughout
the Article, we are in favor of meting out penalties to corporate officers who
broke the law. The problem is that law enforcement authorities do not go into
the trouble of assigning personal liability. In settlement agreements, all those
involved are pooled together. Nor do corporations wish to expend the
resources to distinguish among culpable and innocent employees. Currently,
there is no way out of this pooling equilibrium.
This state of affairs adversely affects good directors and managers. In a
world with perfect separation between good directors and officers and bad
ones, everyone will be rewarded and punished based on their performance.
However, in the age of settlements, corporate directors and officers may bear
the cost of the misdeeds of others. They no longer in full control of their own
fate.164 Enforcement actions, and the settlements signed in their wake, create
inter-dependencies among corporate agents. In the age of compliance, one
bad apple can upset the applecart. Sometimes, one director or corporate
officers who took matters into his own hands and broke the law can get an
entire corporation and its top personnel in trouble.
Over the years, corporate law has adopted several mechanisms to protect
directors and officers from legal liability and thereby lower operation costs
for firms. Standard theorizing assumes that higher exposure to legal liability
must be offset by higher compensation. Hence, if directors and officers face
a high risk of legal liability, they would require higher pay to offset this
risk.165 The central mechanisms that were developed to shelter directors and
164

Id.
See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) (explaining how corporate liability imposes legal risks on
corporate decisionmakers, and accordingly, how “competent corporate decisionmakers will
either demand insulation from them or require compensation for bearing them.”) See also
John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, 64(1) J.
RISK & INSURANCE 63, 66-67 (1997) (“The director will not serve unless the package offered
meets his or her reservation utility . . . level of other pay necessary to compensate the director
165
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officers from liability are the business judgment rule, exculpation clauses,
directors and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance, and indemnification
clauses.
The business judgement rule immunizes directors and corporate officers
against liability for harms arising from mistaken business decisions, as long
as a decision was informed, made in good faith and without conflict of
interest.166 Exculpatory clauses are implemented contractually and have the
effect of relieving high level employees from liability arising from a breach
of a duty of care owed to the corporation.167 D&O liability insurance protects
the directors and officers of a corporation against personal losses resulting
from a suit against them for violating a duty to the firm.168 Indemnification
clauses guarantee directors and officers reimbursement for attorneys’ fees,
legal expenditures and even judgment.169
Although each of these mechanisms operate differently they share a
common purpose: they aim to relieve directors and officers of the need to
incur costs of pay damages for negligent breaches of the duty of care owed
to the corporation. Corporations, for their part, are willing to limit the legal
liability of their directors and managers since it lowers executive
compensation.
Critically, though, two of the aforementioned mechanisms—business
judgement rule and exculpation—are not relevant in the context of criminal
investigations. They are only available in the internal relationship between
directors and officers and their firms. The other two mechanisms—
indemnification and insurance—are subject to mandatory “boundaries” and
depend on the company’s willingness to provide them, its governing
documents, and its insurance policy. 170 At any rate, none of these
mechanisms can compensate directors and officers for the reputational and
for his or her [] any uninsured risk. Thus, other forms of director compensation are
hypothesized to be substitutes for D&O insurance, for a decrease in the level of D&O
insurance results in an increase in the amount of other pay required by the director as a
compensation for the additional risk (the ‘risk premium’).”).
166
See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
167
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 102(b)(7) (2007).
168
Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicating Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from
the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487 (2007)
(arguing that “[n]early all public corporations purchase D&O policies”).
169
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 145(a) (2007).
170
Id. Furthermore, it is worth noting that that insurance coverage is not unlimited. See,
e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors and Officers’
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 805 (2009) (“If, as is generally
the case, D&O insurance limits are significantly lower than potential investor losses.”) See
also Id., at 798 (“The insurer will have two principal case-specific interests: first, and most
obviously, to reduce settlement payouts; and second, to maximize investment returns by
delaying the payout of invested capital.”).
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economic harms they suffer as a result of criminal investigations and
settlements. These harms lie outside the ken of the sphere of protection firms
can provide.171
Since companies cannot offer directors and officers adequate protection
against the reverse agency problem, they would have to pay them higher
compensation that reflects the increased risk to which they are exposed.172
Given that it is impossible to know in advance which directors and officers
would be affected by the higher risk—after all, enforcement actions can be
random—firms would have to increase managerial compensation across the
board. In some cases, the promise of higher compensation would suffice to
persuade competent directors and managers to assume the risk. In others,
potential directors and officers may decide to pursue different career
opportunities. On the margin, the reverse agency problem would drive
capable candidates away from the corporate world.173 This effect should be
especially high among risk averse individuals, who would require very high
compensation to take on extra risk. Indeed, there is already some evidence
suggesting this effect is felt in the corporate world.174

IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

In this Part, we consider possible mechanisms to address the reverse
agency problem. As we explained, a root cause of the reverse agency problem
is the collective treatment of directors and officers in settlements and the
insinuation and the attribution of various elements of wrongdoing to them in
order to establish the guilt of the corporation on which they serve.
The sweeping statements that are made about directors, officers and other
employees without giving them a way to clear their names are neither fair nor
efficient. Hence, the mechanisms we propose in this Part aim at allowing
171

David A. Skeel, JR., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1833
(2001) (describing how defenses that the company provide to its directors and managers,
such as insurance and indemnification, cannot protect them from reputational consequences).
See also JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 52 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing norms of director behavior are stricter and less
forgiving than the liability rules by which directors are evaluated.”).
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Supra note 165.
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Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1140 (2006) (arguing that “[a] significantly higher level of risk for
outside directors could well deter good candidates from serving . . . .”). See also Financier
Worldwide Magazine, Risks Facing Directors & Officers (August 2016) (“the potential to
unfairly blame individuals when not warranted under the circumstances will only serve to
deter qualified people from seeking out and taking director and officer positions.”)
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See Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 471, 488 (2018) (“No wonder, then, that corporate managers, whenever they get a
chance, express vocal complaints and fears about the potential ‘‘death knell’’ represented
by the imposition of criminal liability on their firms.”).
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directors and officers who were involved in criminal investigations to prove
that they are neither guilty of a criminal offense nor that of a breach of a
fiduciary duty to the corporation. In other words, our proposals are intended
to break the pooling effect created by settlements and allow innocent and
diligent directors and officers to distinguish themselves from their peers who
broke the law. To this end, we propose three specific legal mechanisms that
can ameliorate the reverse agency problem.
The first mechanism seeks to amplify the voice of individual corporate
officers in settlement negotiations by giving them a right to a hearing prior to
the finalization of a settlement. This mechanism would enable individual
directors and officers to review settlements and offer changes before they are
signed. The second mechanism we contemplate is to give individual directors
and officers who were implicated in settlements the right to bring an action
for a declaratory judgment that could clear them of liability. Doing so will
grant innocent directors and officers the power to initiate legal action in order
to dispel the suspicions that surround them and preempt derivative actions
against them. Our third, and most far reaching mechanism, is to allow
innocent directors and officers the right to sue their colleagues who went
astray and precipitated a cascade of harms on the corporation and its
employees.
A. A Right to a Hearing
One way to address the reverse agency problem is by providing interested
corporate directors and officers the right to demand a hearing prior to the
signing of a settlement. The hearing will be held by the relevant law
enforcement agency at the end of the investigation after a detailed draft had
been produced, but before the settlement is finalized. The reason for holding
the hearing at this time is to give directors and officers an opportunity to
review the statements made about them, consider their accuracy and propose
amendments to the draft. It is noteworthy that small changes in the language
of the settlement agreement may have a significant impact on the future of
the directors and officers involved.175
The holding of a hearing will give the employees who are covered in the
settlement agreement an opportunity to set the record straight by correcting
potential misstatements about them and other factual errors. It appears to be
the simplest and the most cost-effective solution to the reverse agency
175
To illustrate, there is a huge difference whether a DPA describes a felony as
committed by “employees” or by “certain low level employees; similarly, there is a huge
difference if a DPA states that the admission of the company is being made under the
respondeat superior doctrine; finally, there is a huge difference between a DPA that states
that the company and its officers “knowingly” and “willfully” committed the offence and a
DPA that lacks such descriptions.
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problem. True, the introduction of hearings will prolong investigations and
increase their cost. Yet, reducing costs and shortening investigations are not
goals in their own right; rather, they are important side constraints. The main
goal is to improve accuracy in fact-finding and to further justice by giving
directors and officers a final chance to exonerate themselves of wrongdoing.
Hence, as long as the additional cost of holding hearings is not unreasonably
high, it may be in society’s best interest to do this.
The solution of hearings, while promising on its face, has an obvious
downside. The effectiveness of this solution critically depends on the
willingness of the enforcement agencies to receive input from individual
directors and officers and change their recommendations accordingly. In
other words, the success of hearings depends on the good faith and openness
of the relevant administrative agencies.
In our case, it is questionable that law enforcement agents would adopt
the requisite mindset to make the hearings work. It must be born in mind that
the hearings would come at the end of a long investigation involving
interviews with all the relevant parties and careful legal analysis that yielded
certain findings. At this point, the focus of the law enforcement agencies is
on the large penalty that is about to be collected from the firm. Also, they
may be facing pressures from the firm to bring the investigation to an end.
Finally, inertia, a common phenomenon in administrative agencies,176 may
limit the effectiveness of the proposed hearing.
If law enforcement agencies cannot hold the hearings with an open mind
and an open heart, the hearings will be counterproductive. Not only will the
hearings be costly, but also in their aftermath, it will be nearly impossible for
individual directors and officers to prove their innocence. After all, they were
granted an opportunity to vindicate themselves and failed. At the end of the
day, therefore, hearings should be adopted as a solution to the reverse agency
problem only if lawmakers are convinced that the enforcement agents that
administer them are open to persuasion.
B. Declaratory Judgement
Our second solution to the reverse agency problem relies on the courts. It
harnesses the judicial system to help directors and officers. Specifically, we
propose granting directors and officers who were implicated in investigations
and settlements the right to seek a declaratory judgment in court to their name
176
See, generally, STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 365 (Harvard U.
Press, 2009) (“Thus, it will not be difficult for agencies to reach a decision and then to write
whatever impact statement is needed to justify it. The temptation for the agency to do so will
be great, because of its staff, through inertia, will tend to favor existing regulatory directions.
And in many agencies it is common practice first to reach a decision and then to have a
special opinion-writing section compose a statement in justification.”).
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of wrongdoing. If successful, directors and officers should be able to receive
indemnification from their companies for the legal fees and judicial costs they
incurred. A declaratory judgment that clears individual agents of wrongdoing
will dispel the uncertainty that hovers over them, prevent the automatic filing
of derivative actions against them, and allow them to restore their
reputation177 and carry on with their careers.178
Giving directors and officers the right to sue for a declaratory judgement
has several advantages over the option of granting them a right to a hearing
with an enforcement agency. Judges, unlike law enforcement agents, are
impartial, independent, and immune from market pressures. Judges are much
more likely to consider the claims of directors and officers without prejudice
and grant them the declaratory relief, when appropriate. Judges, of course,
have no personal stake in the outcome of the case and will be guided by their
sense of justice.
Although we believe that the solution of declaratory judgments can help
alleviate the plight of individual directors and officers, as well other corporate
employees, it is not clear that they have standing to sue. It should be
remembered that individual directors and officers are not a formal party to
settlement agreements. Settlements are struck between corporations and law
enforcement authorities. Hence, even though the findings of fact specified in
settlement have a profound effect on the directors and officers, they do not
legally bind the directors and officers. Thus, it is unclear that individual
directors and officers have standing to sue.
We believe that individual directors and officers should not be barred
from suing. We therefore call on courts to open their doors to directors and
officers who seek to exonerate themselves from allegations of wrongdoing.
It must be realized that individual employees of corporations cannot
challenge the content of settlements, nor do they have a meaningful way to
correct the statements made about them by their corporations. Under these
circumstances, courts should lend them a helping hand and allow them to
initiate legal action to clear themselves. Leaving them to live with the
negative implications of settlements to which they were not a party and could
not meaningfully influence is a highly unjust result.
177

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court suggested a
constitutional right to protect one’s reputation. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92
(1966) (“The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion
and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth
of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”).
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See e.g., Fredrick Lawrence, Declaring Innocence: Use of Declaratory Judgements
to Vindicate the Wrongly Convicted, 18 PUBLIC INTEREST L.J. 391, 397 (2009) (“As a remedy
to the stigma suffered by persons wrongfully accused or convicted of criminal acts, this
Article proposes that persons wrongfully accused of criminal acts have a right to sue for a
declaration of innocence.”).
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C. An Action against Other Directors and Officers
Our third solution to the reverse agency problem is to give innocent
directors and officers legal recourse against their colleagues who broke the
law and brought about the criminal investigation. After all, the criminal
investigation against the firm was commenced for a reason and the
admissions of guilt by the corporation are not groundless. In a typical case,
the acts or omissions of those employees trigger the criminal investigation
that will result in the attribution of illicit behavior to their colleagues, who
have done no wrong. Under our proposal, directors and corporate officers
who suffered losses as a consequence of the decisions or behaviors of their
peers would be allowed to sue the peers to recover compensation for their
losses.
It should be emphasized that we will not allow suits against the
corporation itself, but only against individual directors and officers who
strayed from the path. Thus, neither the corporation nor its shareholders
would be affected by our proposal. The implementation of our proposal
requires the law to recognize a new fiduciary duty that will apply among
directors and officers inter se. Under current law, directors and officers owe
a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to their corporations, but not to one
another.179 At present, therefore, fiduciary duties apply only vertically, in the
relationship between corporations and their top agents.
Elsewhere, we argued that the modern business world has become so
complex and specialized that directors and corporate officers have become
dependent on one another. Each of them brings a unique set of skills and
backgrounds to the table. No individual director or officer can be expected to
perform all the tasks that are necessary for the successful functioning of the
corporation on her own. Hence, directors and managers have no choice but
to rely on each other. Failure by one board member or manager can doom the
entire board or management team. For this reason, we suggested recognizing
a new fiduciary duty that would apply horizontally among directors and
officers in their inner relations.180 A breach of the duty by a director or officer
will enable other directors and officers who were harmed by the breach to
seek damages from the delinquent actor.
Allowing directors and officers to seek compensation from peers who
harmed them will provide them with a way to recover for the losses that befell
them. Unlike an administrative hearing or a declaratory judgment that does
not address past harms, a suit for a breach of a horizontal fiduciary duty, if
successful, would make the plaintiff whole. Furthermore, the introduction of
179

Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward a Horizontal Fiduciary Duty in
Corporate Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 803 (forthcoming 2019).
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momentary damages will allow courts to apportion liability among
defendants or reduce compensation awards in cases in which plaintiffs are
found contributorily negligent. In other words, the use of monetary damages
will allow courts to go beyond all or nothing solutions.
D. A Lawsuit against the Company?
A fourth possible solution to the reverse agency problem is to give
directors and corporate officers a cause of action against the corporation for
unnecessarily implicating them in wrongdoing.181 On its face, this appears
like a straightforward response to the reverse agency problem. After all, it is
the company that chose to enter into the agreement and did not go into the
trouble of carefully distinguishing between culpable executives and innocent
ones. A closer examination reveals that the matter is not nearly as simple as
it may appear on first blush. As we explained throughout the Article, the
decision to enter into an agreement with the enforcement authorities and do
so expeditiously is in the best interest of the company. Furthermore, the
board, in deciding to negotiate and approve a settlement, acts within its
fiduciary duty to the company. At present it owes no fiduciary duty to past
executives and directors, or even to the serving ones. Neither does the
company.182
In order to allow executives to sue the firm, it is necessary to create a new
legal duty, not necessarily a fiduciary duty, that obliges the company to treat
its agents fairly and not sacrifice or even jeopardize their reputation to
promote the interest of the firm. It is, of course, possible to recognize such a
duty, but doing so will engender a problem of split loyalties. Presently, at
least under the predominant view, corporate agents have a single goal:
maximizing shareholders’ profits. As we impose additional duties on
corporate officers and directors, we put them in very difficult situations,
requiring them to favor one group of stakeholders over another.
Furthermore, in the case of settlements, companies do not have a lot of
leeway. They face a take it or leave it situation. It is the enforcement
authorities who are in the driver’s seat. Companies do not have any real
bargaining power. Therefore, allowing individual executives to file suits
against their company under these circumstances strikes us an extreme
measure. After all, one might wonder: why not let executives sue law
enforcement authorities? We clearly do not support this option. Law
enforcement authorities should be able to do their job undeterred. As for the
possibility of allowing executives to sue companies, we believe it should be
reserved, if at all, to extreme cases in which companies were reckless or
grossly negligent. This standard would require plaintiffs to prove that
181
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companies could easily distinguish between them and their guilty peers, but
elected recklessly not to do so.

V.

CONCLUSION

In this Article we demonstrated that the agency problem in corporate law
is not one directional as conventional theory suggests, but rather
bidirectional. Since the seminal article of Berle and Means, a central tenet of
corporate law scholarship and policy has been that corporate officers and
directors would sacrifice the interests of their companies and shareholders to
promote their own narrow self-interest. We showed that the reverse
phenomenon also exists. Companies facing criminal and regulatory
investigations are willing to sacrifice their top officials, indeed all of their
employees, in order to appease the investigating authorities and strike a
favorable settlement with them. We dubbed this phenomenon: the reverse
agency problem.
Like its more famous kin, the reverse agency problem arises from
perfectly rational motivation: the desire of firms to avoid criminal indictment
and bring criminal investigation to a rapid close is perfectly sensible. The fact
that to achieve this goal firms are willing to attribute wrongdoing to a large
group of directors and managers, without distinguishing among guilty and
innocent individuals, is consistent with the wealth maximization goal of the
firm and its shareholders.
Yet, the rush of companies to settle imposes a dear cost on innocent
corporate officers by implicating them in various forms of wrongdoing
without giving them any opportunity to clear their name. These officers are
left to bear the mark of Cain for the rest of their career as extant law does not
afford them with any procedural or substantive means of clearing themselves.
Worse yet, the allegations of guilt made about them in settlement agreements
expose directors and officers to subsequent derivative suits from
shareholders. In the compliance age, as the number of enforcement actions
continues to increase, so will the scope and severity of the reverse agency
problem.
As we emphasized time and again throughout the Article, we do not
excoriate the increase in criminal enforcement against corporations and their
employees. On the contrary, we fully support this trend. It is not criminal
enforcement per se that is the root cause of the reverse agency problem, but
rather the zeal of corporations and enforcement authorities to consummate
settlements expeditiously while attributing guilt indiscriminately to large
numbers of individual employees and grouping together guilty and innocent
corporate officers in the process. In addition to unveiling the reverse agency
problem and analyzing its causes and effects, we proposed three mechanisms
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that could ameliorate the problem. Our first proposal was to hold special
hearings that would give directors and officers an opportunity to set the
record straight prior to the finalization of settlements. Our second suggestion
was to allow directors and officers the right to seek a declaratory judgment
clearing them of wrongdoing. Our third and final mechanism was to enable
corporate officers who suffered reputational harms on account of wrongful
actions or omissions by their peers to seek recourse from the latter by bringing
civil actions against them. It is our hope that by unveiling the reverse agency
problem, our article brings about a fuller and more nuanced understanding of
the complex interaction between firms and their officers.

